Fighting Chinese Hegemonism

Tetsuzo Fuwa

Japan Press Service

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

Tetsuzo Fuwa

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Introduction

Akahata from January 12 through April 3, 1992 carried a series of articles, titled "Fighting Chinese Hegemonism." I first wrote 14 articles on the whole process of the 1966 JCP-CPC talks, which led to the rupture of the talks with Mao Zedong. On this problem, detailed records have already been published, including "The Record of JCP-CPC Talks" by Masaru Kojima. But in this series, as I was a member of the JCP delegation to the talks, I tried to vividly throw light on the process as viewed by my own eyes; I at the same time gave priority to placing the matter in the whole context, especially to finding out its connection with the "Great Cultural Revolution" which had been launched in those days.

In 1966 and 1967 when their interference began, I followed with eight articles, focusing on interference and maneuvers by hegemonists and "collaborators," and on our counterattack against them.

All those articles dealt mainly with the 1960s: The JCP-CPC talks which triggered our struggle and the whole struggle at the early stage. So I wrote a supplement to roughly review the later developments of Chinese hegemonism in relation to Japan.

In my report to the JCP Second National Conference in October 1991, a month after the dissolution of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, I pointed out that even after the collapse of Soviet hegemonism, the problem of the hegemonism of

China and North Korea had not yet been resolved. I stressed the importance that "we must continue our efforts so that the problem of hegemonism is completely resolved, bearing deeply in mind that hegemonism in the guise of 'socialism' still exists in the world." We will continue our struggle based on the understanding that that is one of our tasks of great importance for the cause of world peace and social progress.

Tetsuzo Fuwa
October 1992

1966: JCP-CPC TALKS

1. The "Cultural Revolution" and Interference —Mao Zedong Ordered the "Overthrow of the Japanese Communist Party"

It was on the order of Mao Zedong that the Chinese hegemonist interference and attacks on the Japanese Communist Party were launched in 1966, as a focal point of the external operation of what they called the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." They did not hesitate to use any means to carry out their purpose. Their unlawful and uncivilized methods were even worse than those used by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in their interference and attacks on the JCP, which were instigated by Khrushchev and the like.

"Beijing Is Weak-Kneed" "Let's Send Little Demons to the Celestial Palace"

I recall a scene in Shanghai on March 28, 1966, which symbolized the close connection between Chinese attacks on the JCP and the upheaval of the "Cultural Revolution" in their own country.

It was the day when Mao Zedong gave an order to Kang Sheng. This is recorded in "Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought," a collection of Mao Zedong's sayings propagated during the "Cultural Revolu-

tion." Kang Sheng, a close aide of Mao Zedong, was at the time an alternate member of the Political Bureau and a member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of China. Mao said:

> "Destroy the Palace of Yama (Lord of Hell), liberate little demons. I have insisted that when central organs go the wrong way and do evil, local organizations shall be called on to rise up in rebellion and assault the center. Now local organizations must send many Monkeys to disturb the Celestial Palace."[1]

By such phrases as the "Palace of Yama" and "Celestial Palace," Mao meant the leadership of the CPC and the government in Beijing. "Little demons" and "Monkeys" meant the "Red Guards," who acted as Mao Zedong's shock troops during the "Cultural Revolution." This order was the signal to commence the turmoil of the "Cultural Revolution," which aimed at overthrowing the leadership of the party and the government by mobilizing the Red Guards nationwide.

March 28, 1966 had another meaning. It was the day when the JCP delegation, led by the then

1 Here Mao reminds us of a scene from the well-known Chinese tale, "Monkey." In the first part of the story, the Monkey uses his own fur and by one breath creates many small other-selves, and sends them to the "Celestial Palace" to disturb it. (—ed.)

General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto, met Mao Zedong in Shanghai, on their way home from official talks with the CPC. In the meeting, Mao Zedong raised objections to the joint communiqué, which had been signed by the CPC leadership and the JCP delegation. Mao went so far as to denounce, in front of the Japanese delegation, the Chinese side for having agreed to such a joint communiqué, saying, "Beijing is weak-kneed."

Kang Sheng, who was given the order by Mao Zedong, on the morning of the same day accompanied the JCP delegation from Beijing to Shanghai. He was also present at the meeting of Mao Zedong and the JCP delegation. I cannot tell which came first in time, Mao's statement that Beijing "is weak-kneed" or the order he gave Kang Sheng to "overthrow the Palace of Yama." But it is doubtless that in Mao Zedong's mind, his denunciation of "Beijing as being weak-kneed" in dealing with the JCP, and the order of rebellion to overthrow the leadership of the Chinese party and government, were linked.

JCP Named as a Major Enemy of the "Cultural Revolution"

Here is a record of a speech by Mao Zedong, which he is said to have made when attacks on the center in Beijing were being escalated from the dismissal of Peng Zhen from the secretary of the party's Beijing City Committee and the mayor of Beijing, and the reshuffling of the party's Beijing

City Committee in early June 1966, to direct attacks against Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping in August the same year. Mao's speech was made on July 21, 1966 entitled "A speech to the responsible people at the Center." The speech was to "fan the flames" of the "Cultural Revolution," stressing that the masses must be let loose to rise in rebellion. In the speech, Mao asked the question, "Who is the enemy of the Great Cultural Revolution?" and answered it as follows:

> "Who opposes the Great Cultural Revolution? It is U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism, JCP revisionism and the Japanese reactionaries."

Of course, Mao used the phrase "JCP revisionism" scornfully, as representing the Japanese Communist Party. At the time, Chinese interference and attacks on the JCP had already begun, but still remained below the surface, and the situation had not developed to the point of open polemics. On the Chinese "Cultural Revolution," the JCP had not in any sense made its official attitude known, as to whether it was critical or in favor of it. But Mao Zedong at this stage, addressing responsible people of various sections at the center, cited by name the JCP as one of the main international enemies of the "Great Cultural Revolution."

This was the origin of the notorious "Four Enemies" argument, which was used as the rationale for interference in Japan and subordination to the

Chinese position. In this speech, Mao admitted that overthrowing the Japanese Communist Party was from the very beginning one of the basic aims of his "Great Cultural Revolution."

The Japanese Communist Party was engaged in resolute criticism of Soviet hegemonism and its unprincipled collaboration with the United States. At the same time, the JCP was firmly opposed to Chinese hegemonism which aimed at integrating the world movement under Mao Zedong's thought. The existence and activity of such a party of sovereign independence, the Japanese Communist Party, was seen as one of the main "enemies" standing in the way of the hegemonist plans of Mao Zedong and his group.

Thus, Chinese hegemonist interference and attacks on the JCP were commenced on the order of Mao Zedong, as an important part of the operation of the "Great Cultural Revolution," and pursued with extremely uncivilized action.

Fifteen years later, the present leadership of China, centering on Deng Xiaoping, published a resolution of the CPC Central Committee plenary session, summing up the "Cultural Revolution." It said:

> (The "Cultural Revolution") "initiated by a leader laboring under a misapprehension and capitalized on by counterrevolutionary cliques, led to domestic turmoil and brought catastrophe to the Party, the state and the whole people." ("Resolution on Certain Questions in the History

of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," adopted by the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, June 1981)

But on the bad international aspects of the "Great Cultural Revolution," including interference in and attacks on the JCP, they have until now been silent, hoping that these things would be forgotten. They said they engaged in reflection on the past and in reform, but evaded any reflection on their hegemonism, the greatest international evil. In this, we cannot but see a commonalty between the attitude taken by the present CPC leadership and that of the Gorbachev leadership of the former Soviet Union, which stepped down in failure.

2. Tokyo—Why We Planned China Visit

The break with Mao Zedong in March 1966 was a turning point because from that time China launched its hegemonist attacks on the Japanese Communist Party. The JCP delegation's China visit at that time had been planned with the objective of forming an international united front against the U.S. expansion of its war of aggression against Vietnam.

Commencement of the War of Aggression against Vietnam and China's Position

From the time of the John F. Kennedy administration, the United States violated the Geneva Agreement which provided for the withdrawal of foreign troops, put South Vietnam under its occupation, and planned aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north. In August 1964, the United States staged the so-called Tonkin Gulf (called in Vietnam Bac Bo Gulf) incident, and started their military attacks on North Vietnam. After February 1965, it began constant air raids on North Vietnam. Their war of aggression against Vietnam was at a stroke expanded from the military rule in South Vietnam into a frontal attack on socialist Vietnam.

The JCP immediately called on the world peace forces for a united struggle against U.S. aggression and support for the Vietnamese people in their struggle to defend their independence. At that time, because of Soviet interference and attacks on the JCP, relations between the JCP and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were ruptured. But it was logical that the Soviet Union should be included in an international united front and in united action, if it took the position of opposition to U.S. aggression and support for Vietnam.

Before that time, in the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev's collaboration with the United

States had been prevalent. As the United States launched an outright war of aggression, the error of Khrushchev's arguments eulogizing imperialism became apparent to everyone, and in October 1964 Khrushchev lost his position and the new Soviet leadership had to express a position for the promotion of international united action against U.S. aggression and in support of the Vietnamese people.

But at this critical time, China began to strongly oppose an international united front in support of Vietnam. Before that, China had criticized the Soviet Union for its policy of collaboration with the United States, and in a loud voice had called for a struggle against the U.S. imperialist policy of war and aggression. The bankruptcy of the Soviet policy of collaboration with the United States became clear, and in spite of many vacillations on their part they began to take a position of opposition to the aggression against Vietnam. If China's opposition to imperialism had been really sincere, they should have championed the need for an anti-imperialist international united front, and made efforts to develop international joint action in support of the Vietnamese people. If Soviet support for Vietnam was nothing more than just lip service, or their actual policy and actions showed passive weakness which betrayed their words, they should have been criticized in the struggle. By doing this, criticism would have been effective to get the Soviet Union to stand more firmly in support of Vietnam.

But China did not take such a position. Arguing

that "the Soviets are accomplices of U.S. imperialism and we oppose any international united action which includes the Soviet Union," and that "those who really reject any cooperation with the Soviet Union can truly struggle against U.S. imperialism," China began fully hoisting the flag for "an anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front." Although dressed up with stirring words, the intention was to oppose unity of the forces against aggression in Vietnam, and to divide them. This could only give a helping hand to U.S. imperialist forces launching a large scale war of aggression against Vietnam, and put Vietnam in a tight corner. It was an extremely harmful action. This was crystal clear to those who seriously thought about the situation created by U.S. aggression against Vietnam.

China, the biggest socialist country in Asia, a state having a common border with Vietnam, began to advocate such a policy as would cause a split, just at the time when the U.S. war of aggression began in Asia. This was a grave matter affecting the future of the war in Vietnam and world peace.

Visit to Three Countries Planned for an International United Front

This Chinese policy was first declared in a systematic way in a joint article by the editorial departments of *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) and *Hongqi* (Red Flag) on November 11, 1965, entitled "Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on

'United Action.'"

The article denounced the Soviet leadership as "collaborating with U.S. imperialism to dominate the world," and asserted that "we absolutely refuse to take any 'united action' with them." On the Vietnam question, the article said Soviet leaders "are so closely cooperating with the U.S. imperialists in united action," and "are pulling the Vietnam question into the orbit of Soviet-U.S. collaboration." On the Soviet aid extended to Vietnam, the Chinese article said, "They have ulterior motives...they are trying to hoodwink the people at home and abroad, to keep the situation in Vietnam under their control, to gain a say on the Vietnam question and to strike a bargain with U.S. imperialism on it." Their conclusion was that to take joint action with the Soviet Union on the Vietnam question would be "joining them in betraying the revolutionary cause of the Vietnamese people."

Having read the article, the JCP leadership immediately began to study it. They were led to the conclusion that a serious discussion was needed with the parties in the Asian socialist countries, including China, on the question of the formation of an international united front in support of Vietnam. Consequently it was decided to send a delegation to Vietnam, China and North Korea, which was proposed to these countries in December.

The Chinese position was firm on the "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front." It was not anticipated that it would readily change its position

through discussion with a JCP delegation. But if the JCP had done nothing at that critical moment and had watched the serious error do serious harm to the world struggle against imperialism and for peace, it would not have fulfilled its international duty. The JCP should seek every practical possibility. This was our basic position. At the time we took into consideration the following: Mao Zedong had promoted a flexible united front policy in the course of the revolutionary struggle in his own country, twice expressed by cooperation with the Nationalist Party. We thought that there might be the possibility, even though very small, of reaching mutual understanding, by rational discussion with him in person.

Shortly after this, we received notice from the three countries consenting to our sending a delegation. The JCP formed a nine-member delegation, with Kenji Miyamoto (then general secretary) as head, Masayoshi Oka (then member of the Standing Presidium) as vice-head, and including two members of the Presidium, Korehito Kurahara and Itaru Yonehara. I joined the delegation together with colleagues in the Policy Commission, Koichiro Ueda, present Presidium vice-chairman, Hiroshi Tachiki, present Central Committee vice-chairman, Masaru Kojima, present member of the Standing Presidium, and Akira Kudo, present member of the Presidium. It was my first visit to a foreign country, and first talks with a foreign party.

3. To Shanghai by Sea —First Talks with Peng Zhen

Thorough Study of Lenin in Preparation for Talks

The visits were planned for February-March, 1966 and we began preparations. In the preparations, importance was given to analyzing U.S. strategy on its aggression against Vietnam as well as the world situation. But we also concentrated on fully studying theoretical problems related to the question of an international united front.

For example, as grounds for rejecting joint action with the Soviet Union, the Chinese side used parts of Lenin's articles on the struggle against opportunism and revisionism, and turned them into absolute and immutable propositions which could be universally applied to any situation. This method was often used in their articles. For instance, when they found some phrase, at one time used by Lenin, such as "we should draw a demarcation line" from Russian opportunists, they quoted it and said, "Look! Lenin insists on 'drawing a demarcation line.' We can't approve of any joint action with the Soviet Union, but must 'draw a demarcation line.' This was Lenin's position." It was all like this.

They made it a practice to pick up in their own way phrases from the whole of Lenin's theoretical and practical work, which looked favorable to their allegations. Such a dogmatic way of using them as categorical propositions was seen more or less in

their polemics with the Soviets, on the assessment of U.S. imperialism and on their argument of "armed revolution the only way." The same thing was repeated at that time. However, it was well known that Lenin consistently gave importance to the struggle against opportunism and revisionism, but that he also took a flexible position on the question of a united front with those currents when the situation demanded it. But the Chinese disputants distorted Lenin's theory and practice, and stuck to the idea that to categorically reject a united front with an opportunist trend was Lenin's position. Such a position brought into sharp relief the dogmatic errors-Chinese style.

In the talks with the Chinese, this point was naturally covered in the discussion.

We fully studied the lessons of the communist movements of the world, including the anti-fascist united front and Nationalist-Communist cooperation in China. We made it a theoretical task to restudy Lenin's theory and practice on this question, not restricted to separate experiences of separate periods, but covering the whole of his revolutionary life.

Let me tell you of some of the lengths we went to. For the convenience of all the delegation members for their study, I began to collect all Lenin's arguments on united front problems and the struggle against opportunism and revisionism, from Lenin's "Collected Works." At that time copying machines were not available as they are today. After thinking

and thinking, I went to Otsuki Shoten, the publisher of Lenin's "Collected Works" (Japanese language edition), and got full sets, which I found in a heap of incorrectly collated volumes in a warehouse in the attic. I picked out Lenin's references to united front problems, imperialism, war and peace and on other questions which we thought would be needed in the polemic with China. These extracts were compiled into a bulky volume.

The fruits of the study were reflected in two articles on the questions of an international united front and united action against imperialism, which were made public around the time of the party's visit to the three countries: "For Consolidation of International United Action and a United Front against U.S. Imperialism," published by *Akahata* on February 4, 1966, and the other entitled "Again on Strengthening International United Action and a United Front against U.S. Imperialism" in *Akahata* on August 8. The collection of extracts was passed to all members of the delegation for their study. We had it with us during our visits and made very good use of it in the polemics which took place.

China Says It Prepares for War by the U.S. and the Soviet Union

On the morning of February 9, 1966, the delegation departed by ship from Moji Port in the northern part of Kyushu. The ship was a Chinese cargo vessel called Hongqi (Red Flag). We left for Shanghai together with cargo being transported from Japan to China.

The plan was to visit Vietnam first, as Vietnam was in the forefront of the struggle against the U.S. war of aggression. We scheduled to have talks with the Vietnam Workers' Party to get a good understanding of the situation around Vietnam, then to hold talks with the leadership of the Communist Party of China; and lastly to visit North Korea for talks with the Workers' Party of Korea. In particular, it was essential to grasp the actual scale and substance of Soviet assistance to Vietnam in order to make a success of the talks with the Chinese leadership. We could not but go to Vietnam via China because there was no direct route to Vietnam.

As the three countries we were visiting had no diplomatic ties with Japan, Japan having a hostile policy toward them, we had difficulties in reaching them because of transportation. At the time, there was no telephone available between Japan and these countries. Even air mail took many days. Telegrams were the only means of urgent correspondence. As the trip was expected to last more than one month, a large part of the JCP leadership, including General Secretary Miyamoto, would be out of Japan for the period and would be almost without any daily communication with Japan. It was a very serious problem in terms of all the party's activities. In spite of such difficulties, the JCP made the visit to the three countries for the great purpose of seeking the possibility for forming an international united front.

It was February 4, prior to the departure of the delegation, that the unsigned article entitled "For Consolidation of International United Action and a United Front against U.S. Imperialism" was carried by *Akahata*, clarifying the position of the JCP on the problem of an international united front. If all our counterparts in the talks read and studied the article, they could get to understand in detail the views of the JCP on the issue.

We got to Shanghai on the evening of February 10 after a one and a half day voyage. Ichiro Sunama, a member of the Secretariat who was stationed in China, joined the delegation in Shanghai.

On February 13 during our stay in Shanghai, Peng Zhen, a Political Bureau member of the Communist Party of China, with Kang Sheng, visited us where we were staying and had a talk with Miyamoto, the head of the delegation. Peng and Kang said they were on their way back from a meeting with Mao Zedong. We talked about the international situation, domestic problems and other subjects. The talk was not official, but was a meeting for an "exchange of information" in which both sides preparatively explained their position. What the Chinese leadership was thinking, which we understood from them, surprised us.

> "Now the danger of the United States launching a war against China is increasing more and more. The Soviet Union and the United States not only develop joint propaganda in the world against China, but also strengthen their military siege."
>
> "The Soviet Union is increasing its forces in the Far East, particularly near China."
>
> "Once the United States attacks China, the Soviet Union will also attack it."
>
> "The Soviet Union is spreading propaganda throughout the country about Chinese territorial ambitions, and promoting mobilization within the party, with the aim of instigating war."

Peng Zhen even told us that there is a U.S.-Soviet agreement on dividing China into North and South, with the Yangzi River as the boundary.

Based on this view, their future prospects for the Vietnam War were: "If the United States launches a massive attack on the Chinese mainland, the Soviet Union will enter China on the grounds of giving assistance and try to occupy a part of Chinese territory"; in addition, "There is the possibility that the Soviet Union will directly attack China in response to the moves of the U.S. aggressor force"; therefore, "We now direct our attention to preparing for war against both the United States and the Soviet Union."

Their analysis of the situation was far removed from reality. They branded the Soviet leadership as an enemy force which was trying to invade China in alliance with the United States. It was an extreme view such as we could not expect from the articles published by China. The scenario which regarded the Soviet Union as a military ally of the United States in the war of aggression naturally led to the

argument for refusing "joint action" with the Soviet Union.

4. Shanghai—Eve of Tumult of "Great Cultural Revolution"

Struggle against "Capitalist Roaders in Authority" Stressed by Peng Zhen

In the talks, Peng Zhen spoke on the basic points of Chinese domestic problems. We felt strange when he frequently stressed the struggle against those whom he called "persons in authority taking the capitalist road," as the most serious issue inside the country. He said:

> —Now a struggle is developing throughout China. It is a struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road. At the center is the struggle against capitalist "persons in authority" who are within the CPC. "Persons in authority" means those who have real power in production teams, factories and People's Communes. They are playing a major part in reviving capitalism. Such a capitalist road has not only appeared among party cadres at the lower and middle levels, but it is also reflected in the party center.

According to Peng Zhen's explanation, this struggle against "persons in authority" was launched by Mao Zedong in 1963. "Witnessing the power of the Soviet Union being seized by the bourgeoisie 40 years after its establishment by

Lenin," Mao Zedong drew the lesson from it and in a Central Committee meeting four years earlier had said that the "class struggle must be continued for one hundred or even several hundred years." The struggle now being waged in China against "the persons in authority taking the capitalist road" is, Peng said, a struggle of "Who beats who?" and "Will capitalism revive, or do we defeat the revival of capitalism by pushing forward the socialist revolution?"

This was nothing other than the guiding policy of the "Cultural Revolution." Before three months had elapsed from then, Peng Zhen became the first target labeled as a "person in authority taking the capitalist road." He was then overthrown and purged. But when he talked about the policy to Miyamoto, the JCP delegation head, there was no sign that he was aware of it—maybe he could not imagine such a development in which he would be condemned for this crime.

It Was at the Time When Mao Zedong Was Preparing for an Attack on Beijing

The fact was that Peng Zhen visited the JCP delegation on his way back from making arrangements with Mao Zedong on the policy for the so-called domestic class struggle, especially on the struggle in the spheres of science and culture.

It was the peak time of Mao Zedong's secret preparations for the tumult which later broke out as

the "Great Cultural Revolution." It seems that although having established his absolute authority as chairman of the party, Mao Zedong from an early stage was plotting to overthrow the central bodies of the party, which were centered on Liu Shaoqi, party vice-chairman, and to establish a more effective autocracy for himself. One of the first targets in Mao's scheme was Peng Zhen, who was responsible for the party organization in the capital, Beijing, as well as for propaganda and other fields at the party center. The first step in Mao's operation to expel Peng Zhen was an attack on Wu Han, vice-mayor of Beijing under Peng Zhen.

At the beginning of November 1965, in a newspaper in Shanghai, there suddenly appeared an article written by Yao Wenyuan, criticizing Wu Han's historical drama "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office." The Yao Wenyuan article, entitled "On the New Historical Drama, 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office,'" attacked the drama as praising the ruling class of feudal society and representing the ideology of the landlord and bourgeois class. Who was Hai Rui? Hai Rui was a bureaucrat in 16th century feudal China, and is said to have worked in the peasants' interests and was dismissed by the Emperor for this reason. Wu Han's praise of this bureaucrat invited the charge that he took the position of landlord and bourgeois thought on history and the state. The truth is that the Yao Wenyuan's article was written at the behest of Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, and the final touch was made by Mao

Zedong himself. The article was also carried in *Renmin Ribao*, the central organ paper of the CPC, at the end of November.

But what was directly criticized in the article was the historical evaluation of the person, Hai Rui. In this respect, the criticism was within the bounds of scholastic polemics as an issue of historical scientific interpretation. But Mao's real aim went far beyond this. In December, in a meeting with his close aides, Mao highly evaluated the Yao Wenyuan article, saying, "This is well written." But he added, "It has not yet got to the kernel of the subject." The "kernel" was, Mao said, that "Hai Rui means Peng Dehuai." Peng Dehuai was a party leader, a Political Bureau member and the defense minister. In 1959 Peng Dehuai criticized the error of Mao's "Great Leap Forward" policy, and was dismissed from his posts in the party and the government, and also jailed under the stigma that he was the leader of an "anti-party group." He was a target of criticism.

If Hai Rui means Peng Dehuai, then Wu Han must be the conspirator who used the historical metaphor of likening Mao Zedong to the Emperor, for the purpose of criticizing Mao Zedong and trying to rehabilitate Peng Dehuai. By this logic, Mao framed Wu Han as having committed an "anti-party, anti-socialist" political crime. Mao's plan following this breakthrough, was to expand the attacks to include Peng Zhen, and then to escalate them to cover all party bodies centered on Liu

Shaoqi.

Later Mao Zedong proudly revealed that the "Great Cultural Revolution" had begun with the publication of Yao Wenyuan's article. In this sense, this was the first signal shot for Mao's "expedition to Beijing."

The Traces of Kang Sheng, Mao Zedong's Conspiratorial Aide

Peng Zhen was responsible for the Five-Man Working Group of the Cultural Revolution, established at the party center, and was charged with dealing with this problem. He was not aware of Mao's tactics. Maybe he was embarrassed because he could not make out Mao's real aim of stretching the criticism of Wu Han to a political issue. When he met the JCP delegation in Shanghai, Peng revealed to Korehito Kurahara, a delegation member in an informal conversation, that he was "perplexed, as Mao says it is a political issue, in spite of it being a historical drama." This may have been a revelation of Peng's true feelings.

It was just on this problem that Peng Zhen had visited Mao Zedong for consultations. Before that, the Five-Man Working Group of the Cultural Revolution discussed how to deal with the problem that was triggered by the Yao Wenyuan article. They reached a conclusion. They summed it up in "An Outline of the Report of the Five-Man Working Group of the Cultural Revolution concerning the

Present Academic Discussions," which was later called the "February Outline." After getting the approval of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, Peng Zhen visited Mao Zedong on February 8. As Mao expressed no objection to it, Peng took it as approval by Mao, and circulated it throughout the country as a party center decision. Later, when the campaign condemning Peng Zhen was at its height, his greatest anti-Mao crime was said to have been that he had arbitrarily made up the "February Outline" and circulated it throughout the country, using the name of the party center.

During the "Great Cultural Revolution," when the campaign of condemnation of Peng Zhen developed, it reminded me of the words and behavior of Peng Zhen when I met him in Shanghai. I keenly felt the conspiratorial means used by Mao Zedong for launching attacks on Beijing. Later, when Peng Zhen was "accused" in the "Great Cultural Revolution," his February visit to Mao Zedong was also quoted as part of his conspiracy against Mao Zedong. But Peng Zhen, when we met him, was not by any means anti-Mao. His words were those of a loyal follower of the Mao Zedong line. On the contrary, Mao and his like used the most conspiratorial means. Mao gave no sign of objection when Peng Zhen brought the "Outline of the Report" to him. After Peng Zhen felt reassured and circulated it to the whole party, Mao and his like advanced this as evidence of his conspiracy. I know the same method was also used again on the question of the

joint communiqué with the JCP.

In terms of its sinister implications, the traces of Kang Sheng should also be noted. Kang Sheng was the only CPC leader who attended all the talks with the JCP delegation, from the first unofficial talks in Shanghai and the official talks in Beijing, to the talks with Mao Zedong.

Kang Sheng was a veteran CPC leader who had worked in the Comintern in the 1930s. At the time, he was an alternate member of the Political Bureau and a member of the Secretariat. He was known as one of Mao Zedong's closest aides. He was one of the main promoters of the criminal "Great Cultural Revolution," and died from an illness in 1975. After the death of Mao Zedong, the "Great Cultural Revolution" was rejected. Along with the "Gang of Four," Kang Sheng was questioned severely about his "counterrevolutionary" responsibility. In fact, in the CPC Central Committee plenary session in 1978, he was condemned as a leader of the "Lin Biao-Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary group," and in 1980 he was deprived of his party membership.

Kang Sheng, knowing Mao's real intention in his criticism of Wu Han, took part in the drafting of the "February Outline" as one of the Five-Man Working Group, and went with Peng Zhen on his visit to Mao Zedong, and attended the meeting. When Mao was intent on overthrowing Peng Zhen as a "counterrevolutionary," Kang Sheng did not hesitate to act as the executioner of Mao's operation.

5. Hanoi—First Full Official Summit Talks with Vietnam

In China Mao Zedong Is Praised Like a Merciful Monarch

We stayed in Shanghai for four days, then moved to Guangzhou, and then went to Nanning near the border with Vietnam.

When we stayed in Shanghai and Guangzhou, we were invited to cultural events on many occasions. But dramas, songs and dancing, and other such performances made us feel quite strange, because all were deeply imbued with the personality cult of Mao Zedong.

They went far beyond praising him as a revolutionary leader. They said because of Mao Zedong, the peasants were liberated from exploitation by the landlords. It was also said that everything the Chinese people enjoyed was a gift from Mao Zedong. In other words, what was common to all these stage performances was the praise given to Mao Zedong, which was presented as if it were in praise of a merciful monarch who had granted everything to the people.

At the time, when we returned from seeing a drama to the place where we were staying, Korehito Kurahara, who was good at jokes, sighed and said, "Mou taku-san." ("It's too much." In the Japanese language, Mao Zedong is pronounced as "Mou taku-tou."—ed.) This made us laugh. It was during

the trip that I came to realize that making jokes was a special talent of his. In conversations, we often said jokingly that the "Works of Korehito Kurahara" needed one additional volume, "Collection of Jokes."

From our experience in many places, we found that *zeji* (Chinese traditional acrobatics and tricks) included less propaganda about Mao Zedong, so after this, when asked what cultural events we wanted to see, we made it a habit to answer "*zeji*." The Chinese people who were looking after the JCP delegation said dubiously, "We don't know why, but the JCP delegation likes *zeji*." The extraordinary personality cult we witnessed then was the overture to the "Great Cultural Revolution."

On the evening of February 17, we left Nanning for Hanoi by plane. Although at that time U.S. air raids on the North had not yet reached Hanoi and the surrounding area, their bombing of the North was going further north day by day. The reason why we departed in the evening was to enable us to arrive in Hanoi in darkness, lest the plane be attacked by U.S. warplanes.

Because of this schedule, when we landed at a small military airfield near Hanoi and arrived at the Guest House in Hanoi by car, it was already dark. In front of the Guest House we saw more than a thousand people assembled, including women dressed in colorful *ao dai* (Vietnamese traditional one-piece garments). There were President Ho Chi Minh, First Secretary Le Duan and other leaders of

the Vietnamese party and government, who had come to give us a heartfelt welcome.

Through 30 Hours of Talks over Five Days

The talks with the leadership of the Vietnam Workers' Party began on February 19. We were struck by their detailed study of JCP policy and arguments. The JCP "February 4" article on an international united front had not reached them, so immediately after arrival, we handed them an English-translated text. They translated it overnight from English to Vietnamese, and all the Vietnamese participants in the talks read it before the talks began. In the talks, each Vietnamese delegate had a copy of the translated article on their desk. We felt how seriously the Vietnamese party noted the policy and the views of the JCP.

Those who took part in the talks from the Vietnamese party were key members of the leadership, including First Secretary Le Duan, and Political Bureau members Truong Trinh, Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Duy Trinh (concurrently vice-premier and foreign minister). The talks took a very long time. They took 30 hours net over five days. President Ho Chi Minh also took part unexpectedly, and spoke. In the tense situation of U.S. air raids on the North intensifying, they devoted such a long time to such intensive talks. This was a clear expression of how important the Vietnamese side regarded the talks.

From way back, there had been friendly relations between the JCP and the Vietnam Workers' Party. But it was the first time that the top level leaders of the two parties, such as General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto and First Secretary Le Duan, had met and held full-scale talks.

The Vietnamese party knew well the JCP policy of sovereign independence and its criticism of the Khrushchev policy seeking cooperation with the United States. The Vietnamese got to know this position of the JCP on the occasion of the Meeting of Representatives of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties in 1960, and through JCP documents including relevant articles and party decisions. But because of the very complicated situation in the world's communist movements, there were many things we could not understand about each other's position and course, unless we met and talked face-to-face.

In the talks, we got to know for the first time many important facts about the Vietnam Workers' Party. For example, the Vietnamese party had consistently protested to the Soviet Union on Soviet interference and attacks on the JCP. When Aleksandr N. Shelepin visited Vietnam, the Vietnamese said, "Your interference in the JCP is wrong" and demanded that "such interference as aid to Yoshio Shiga should be stopped immediately." We got to know this specifically through the talks.

In this sense, the 5-day talks were an occasion for both parties to "discover each other" again, and

each day to deepen mutual understanding of each other's position. The talks covered various problems of a wide range, from the situation in Japan and Vietnam to the problems of the world's communist movements. The discussions became deeper on the second day compared to the first day; and further so on the third day compared to the second day. We continued the talks for five days. In conclusion, both parties confirmed that they held very strong points in common.

What was especially important was: The Vietnamese view on the war of aggression against Vietnam and the international situation concerning the war, which was made clear by the Vietnamese in the talks, to a major degree coincided with the analysis, assessment and policy of the Japanese Communist Party, including its criticism of erroneous policy prevailing in the Soviet Union and China. The JCP policy, which called for an anti-imperialist international united front and international united action, proved to meet the serious and urgent demand of the Vietnamese situation.

The fact that deep mutual understanding was established between the JCP and the Vietnam Workers' Party and that both parties confirmed common points was the starting point and the firm basis of the longstanding struggle of both parties in solidarity. It played an important part in support of the Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. aggression and for salvation of the nation.

Later, at the beginning of the 1970s, when the

international situation around Vietnam had been seriously complicated by the Nixon visits to China and the Soviet Union, the Vietnamese party translated the JCP relevant articles into Vietnamese, and sent them to the cadres and activists striving underground in the South, with the idea that a study of these articles would help them to unite their determination on a correct basis. This was one of the fruits of the talks between the JCP and the Vietnam Workers' Party, held in February 1966.

6. Thanh Hoa—Visit to Front Line under Bombing of North

Both Parties in Complete Agreement on the Problem of an International United Front

In the talks between the two parties, Vietnamese First Secretary Le Duan gave a detailed report on the history and present situation of the war on Vietnam. He analyzed the means used by the United States for their invasion of Vietnam, especially on the launching of their bombing of the North. It was not that the United States forced it through in defiance of any possible strong counterattacks by the socialist countries, he said. "First, they sounded out the possible reaction of each socialist country. After assessing the countermoves made by the Soviet Union and China, and judging that these socialist countries were not intending to take any strong action, the United States expanded its air raids step by step." It was in February 1965, during Kosygin's visit to North Vietnam, that the United States began its air raids on the North. The United States boldly chose the best time to test the reaction, Le Duan said.

Recalling the U.S. frame-up of the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964, and then the U.S. military attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, part of the world socialist camp, First Secretary Le Duan said, "At that time, the weak reaction of the socialist countries was a shock to the world." To us, this was an impressive explanation. We came to understand why, in their internal talks with the Soviet Union, the Vietnamese came to make courageous frontal criticisms of the policy of Khrushchev and his like, who sought collaboration with the United States and which led to the serious situation that followed.

The report of the Vietnamese delegation, made from the standpoint of having been forced to be the target of U.S. aggression, has in effect proved the correctness of the JCP analysis, which characterized the U.S. policy of aggression as a policy of "defeating the enemy one by one," taking advantage of Khrushchev's policy of collaboration with the United States on the one hand, and on the other the international disunity of socialist countries.

The Vietnamese stressed from various angles that in order to defeat the U.S. aggression, the Vietnamese people needed international aid, and the greatest international aid is that which comes from the strength of unity, or international united action

and an international united front. First Secretary Le Duan said in clear terms, "How to form a wide-ranging united front in support of Vietnam, including the socialist camp and the national liberation movements, is a very pressing issue for Vietnam. In this respect, we deeply thank the JCP, which has consistently called for an international united front against U.S. imperialism."

During the talks, President Ho Chi Minh came in unannounced. He slipped on his famous "Ho Chi Minh sandals" made of rubber from an old tire. He opened his right hand and stretched it out to us, saying, "Every (communist and workers) party in each country is now aiding us. Regrettably, it is this way." Then, making a clenched fist, he said, "If they aided us in this way, it would give us far more power." Although he spoke very briefly, we were very impressed, as it represented the warm expectations of the Vietnamese people for an international united front.

During the talks, the father of First Secretary Le Duan passed away. On the final day, Truong Trinh, member of the Political Bureau, spoke on behalf of the Vietnam Workers' Party. Again expressing thanks for the efforts of the JCP for an international united front, he said, "We made a very detailed analysis of the JCP article of February 4. We agree with the basic viewpoint of the article." This can be said to be the important conclusion of the 5-day talks.

The agreement of the two parties on the problem

of an international united front was, as a matter of course, expressed in the joint communiqué which was published on March 1 simultaneously in Tokyo and Hanoi. It said:

> "The two parties unanimously hold that at present the formation and expansion of a united front of the world's peoples against U.S. imperialism, for world peace and national independence is an extremely important and urgent task."

Reality at the Front Line Shows that Working for an International United Front Is the Correct Way

After the talks, the JCP delegation divided into two groups. One group, including Kenji Miyamoto, head of the delegation, stayed in Hanoi and visited factories and looked at other places. The other group, including Masayoshi Oka, vice delegation head, went to the front line under the U.S. bombing of the North, to see the real situation of the struggle. I took part in the group visiting the front.

Our destination was Thanh Hoa Province, some 200 kilometers south of Hanoi. It was one of the areas heavily bombed. The bombing was being extended to areas further north. Because it was wartime we could only move at night in the dark. On the rivers we saw that almost all the bridges had been destroyed. To cross the rivers, we had to drive on make-shift bamboo bridges, and pontoons. We arrived at our destination late at night. Temporary

lodgings, made of bamboo and cogongrass, were prepared for us. This was done out of consideration for us to ensure that we were not a target of the bombing.

In the Thanh Hoa Province, there was an iron bridge called the Hamrong Bridge. In spite of more than 1,000 air raids targeted on the bridge, it was repaired each time and was actually in use. The bridge was called a symbol of the undaunted struggle of the Vietnamese people in the face of whatever bombing there was. All the villagers were involved in defense of the bridge. We saw the wrecks of U.S. bombers shot down in the village. We met the village women's militia corps. We were astonished when introduced to a woman, who looked rather like a small girl, but was a crack shot with an ordinary rifle in shooting down U.S. aircraft.

We also visited an anti-aircraft gun unit to encourage them. It was positioned at the top of a hill near the Hamrong Bridge to defend it. All their anti-aircraft guns had been given as aid from the Soviet Union. During our moves, in the dark we occasionally saw missile corps making their way to the front line.

Before this, in the talks with the Chinese in Shanghai, we heard Peng Zhen arguing that Soviet aid to Vietnam included weapons made in the 1930s, which were of course useless, and that the Soviet Union was bold enough to ask China to transport this kind of weapon. He said this in support of the Chinese argument that the United States and the

Soviet Union were accomplices in the Vietnam War. In this way, Peng Zhen tried to depict Soviet aid to Vietnam as given only for Soviet face-saving, hinting that it was China only that was providing substantial aid to Vietnam. This ready-made formulation on the assessment of Soviet aid was repeated in later talks with Liu Shaoqi and others in Beijing, and in the talks with Mao Zedong in Shanghai.

But the explanation given by the Vietnamese in the talks in Hanoi was different. They said, "In Khrushchev's time, on Vietnam the Soviets only maneuvered for a compromise with the United States, in submission to the United States. But now they have started opposing imperialism to some extent. Of course, their form of opposition to the United States contains remnants of their compromising attitude toward the United States. But their aid to Vietnam is now becoming substantial. A major part of Vietnam's anti-aircraft guns and missiles were sent from the Soviet Union." What we saw at the front under the U.S. air raids on the North confirmed this.

In terms of money, aid from the Soviet Union is, the Vietnamese said, almost the same as that from China. They also said it was not only for the North, but the Soviet Union had begun to extend its aid to the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. This, they said, is one significant change since Khrushchev.

In addition to the talks, our visit to the front made clear how groundless the Chinese explanation was,

that Soviet aid was just a formality and insignificant. This also very much confirmed the correctness of the JCP's argument that the formation of an international united front was the urgent need in the anti-imperialist struggle.

7. Beijing(1)—Origin Is Contest with Soviets for Hegemony

Renmin Ribao Carries Full Text of JCP's February 4 Article

The JCP delegation wound up its visit to Vietnam, and left Hanoi on February 27.

We arrived in Nanning, China, late at night. When we looked at Chinese newspapers and magazines which had been published during our stay in Vietnam, what caught our eyes at once was the full text of the JCP February 4 article, translated into Chinese, "For Consolidation of International United Action and United Front against U.S. Imperialism." It was carried by February 25 issue of *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily). Three whole pages of the Chinese newspaper were given to the JCP article. But this did not mean that we could assume that the Chinese were coming closer to the JCP on the united front issue. The same edition of *Renmin Ribao* also carried an article by the Communist Party of Australia-Marxist-Leninist(CPA-ML), which was opposed to "united action" that included the Soviet Union. The presentation took the form of the JCP article being carried as part of the objective introduction of views held by various foreign parties.

The joint communiqué of the JCP and the Vietnam Workers' Party, which was announced on March 1 in Tokyo and Hanoi, was not reported to the end by *Renmin Ribao*. If it had shown that the Vietnamese, who were suffering from U.S. aggression, were aspiring to an anti-imperialist international united front, then the publication of the joint communiqué would go beyond the objective introduction of certain views. This, the CPC leadership could not tolerate.

Anyhow, *Renmin Ribao* reported the full text of the JCP February 4 article, just before the talks commenced between the two parties. We guessed that the Chinese position was that they at least intended to have a full-scale discussion on this issue.

The talks were scheduled to begin on March 3. The Chinese delegation was composed of Party Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi as delegation head, Deng Xiaoping (general secretary), Peng Zhen (Political Bureau and Secretariat member), Kang Sheng (alternate Political Bureau member and Secretariat member), Liao Chengzhi (Central Committee member) and Liu Ningyi (Central Committee member). Wu Lengxi, editor-in-chief of *Renmin Ribao*, and Zhang Xiangshan and Zhao Anbo, staff members on Japanese affairs, were also present.

The talks were held over four days: March 3, 4, 6 and 8, excluding holidays. The domestic problems

of either side were not on the agenda. The talks were exclusively concerned with international issues focused on the Vietnam question. The discussions were very calm, but essentially there were sharp conflicts, and each side expressed its own position in a polemical way. Objectively, it can be said that they were polemics of very great significance in the history of the world's communist movements.

Kenji Miyamoto, head of the delegation, spoke for the JCP delegation. Chinese contributions were made mainly by Liu Shaoqi, but sometimes Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen and Kang Sheng interjected with brief comments.

Explanations on the Chinese position, given by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, could be boiled down to this: The present Soviet leadership in the final analysis was a "detached force" of the United States, and therefore there was no possibility at all of "united action" with the Soviet Union. If one genuinely wanted to struggle against U.S. imperialism, one had to break with the Soviet Union. This from beginning to end was their argument.

But they did not use the arguments that Peng Zhen had used in the preliminary talks in Shanghai, that the United States and the Soviet Union were jointly planning to launch a military attack on China, and aimed at dividing China between themselves. When the Chinese side referred to the Soviets' anti-China propaganda, they mentioned the possibility of its developing into a Soviet military attack on China saying, "Such a possibility exists at certain times," but they also said that if the Soviets resorted to this, "they would further lose the people's support." But in the talks they never returned to this.

The major grounds on which Liu Shaoqi regarded the Soviet Union as a "detached force" of the United States were, as far as the Vietnam question was concerned, not that the Soviets were accomplices in the U.S. plot of aggression against China, but that from fear of possible world war they became capitulators, urging Vietnam to yield to the United States. His points in the arguments were different from Peng's, but the conclusion was the same, that they were opposed to "united action" with the Soviet Union.

Liu Shaoqi's Argument for an "Anti-U.S., Anti-Soviet United Front"

Liu Shaoqi took a net six hours for his explanation. The grounds on which the Chinese based the "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front" argument became all the clearer. The Chinese view as explained by Liu Shaoqi could be summed up as follows:

> —In the Soviet Union, capitalism has already been revived. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has turned into being, internally, a fascist party of the bourgeoisie. Internationally it has become a "detached force" of the United States. Their fundamental policy is "to ally themselves with the United States and to dominate the world

by Soviet-U.S. cooperation." Therefore, one who genuinely wants to struggle against U.S. imperialism must struggle against the Soviet Union.

—On the Vietnam question, the Soviet Union has become a U.S. ally. Previously the Soviets followed a policy of non-involvement (the Chinese called it a "withdrawal policy"), but recently they have changed to a "policy of involvement." But all this is by agreement with the United States. Their aid to Vietnam is reported to the United States, and they do it within a framework of U.S. understanding. Their aim is to put the Vietnam question onto the track of "domination of the world by U.S.-Soviet cooperation." Therefore, once there is "united action" with the Soviet Union, it would lead to surrendering to the United States and handing South Vietnam over to the United States.

—As regards the opinion that Soviet aid is necessary for the struggle against the U.S. bombing of the North, we need not fear the U.S. bombing. Human losses from bombing are recoverable. In the Korean War, over one million human lives were lost, but after the cease-fire, the population level was recovered. In short, the effect of bombing in war is very limited.

The Chinese could not make a frontal rejection of united action in support of the Vietnamese people, to be carried out by international democratic movements. But they said, "The effect of international democratic movements is not so powerful. Even if a good resolution were adopted by an international conference, it would not have much influence. We once took united actions with the Soviet Union in international democratic movements, and the results were not good. If we get a bit closer to the revisionists, the demarcation between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism will become vague."

These Chinese arguments were far removed from the reality of the Vietnamese people's struggle, the struggle which we witnessed with our own eyes. In a sense, these Chinese arguments were very "systematic," but were in common with Peng Zhen's arguments in the Shanghai talks in that they were a catalogue of arbitrary propositions without any factual proof.

They were not based on what the Vietnamese people needed in their struggle, the struggle they were waging with numerous sacrifices. The Chinese started from their own policy of breaking with the Soviet leadership, and tried to apply this schema exclusively to their view of the situation in Vietnam and the world. This approach clearly permeated all their arguments.

"We Can Check Them Only with Weapons in Hand Even If Small in Number"

Such arbitrary thinking was especially prominent when they argued about the situation in the world's revolutionary movements. According to Liu Shaoqi, we were now on the eve of a Third

World War, and it was imperative for genuine revolutionary forces to prepare for revolutionary struggle, that is, armed struggle. In concluding his criticism of the Soviet Union, he spoke for promoting division of the world's communist movements. It was clear that his position was linked with that of regarding only those groups promoting armed struggle as the genuine revolutionary "left."

> —The aggressive and reactionary force of war can only be liquidated by the revolutionary force of war. Now that there is the possibility of the outbreak of a Third World War, the most important thing is to prepare to confront it by a revolutionary war. Once a war breaks out, party members of 200,000, or 300,000, or one million strong, and mass demonstrations and strikes would not be of much use. But if several thousand or several tens of thousand people could take arms in their hands, they would be able to check the imperialist forces of war.
>
> —Division has already started in the world communist movement. Breaking with the current, as represented by the Soviet leadership, is inevitable both internationally and in respective countries. This can be compared to Lenin's severance with the parties of the Second International. To take "united action" with the Soviet leadership for whatever reason, would only help the Soviets to gloss over their real nature, and would make it difficult for us to draw a demarcation line between them and us.

Liu Shaoqi's argument on the world situation helped us to see the Chinese idea, that is, by way of propagating the policy for "preparations for a revolutionary war," the ultra-left forces in the world's communist and revolutionary movements should be united, under the "leadership" of China, to confront the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, JCP delegation head Miyamoto fully developed the JCP views on how to grasp the seriousness of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, on how urgent the need was for anti-imperialist international united action, and on the assessment of the present Soviet leadership. Of course, he severely pointed out the fundamental error of the Chinese argument that it was necessary to "prepare for a revolutionary war" in preparation for a Third World War.

8. Beijing(2)—Differences of Opinion Calmly Confirmed

Let me introduce two episodes that took place in the two-party talks.

Important Information Had Not Reached Liu Shaoqi

The first episode during the exchanges was on the character of Soviet aid to Vietnam.

In the talks, Liu Shaoqi as usual insisted that Soviet assistance to Vietnam was a sham. As proof he raised the point that "the Soviet Union has only

given assistance to the North and rendered no help to the revolutionary struggle in the South."

In Vietnam, we made a careful study of the real position on Soviet aid. Therefore, Miyamoto immediately pointed out Liu Shaoqi's misunderstanding, saying, "We heard recently that Soviet assistance has been given to South Vietnam, too." Then Deng Xiaoping said, as if whispering into Liu Shaoqi's ear, "Some arms and ammunition, such as katyusha, have been given to the southern part." Liu Shaoqi, trying to make his remarks consistent, said, "Soviet assistance is not much because their aim is to get the Vietnam War on the track of Soviet-U.S. collaboration." However, it was already clear that Liu Shaoqi was ignorant of the recent changes in Soviet aid to Vietnam.

This taught us a lot of things.

First, Deng Xiaoping, party general secretary handling daily party work, did not let even Liu Shaoqi, party vice-chairman, have information that did not favor their arguments.

Does the Soviet Union restrict its aid to defense of the North only? Has it begun giving assistance to the liberation forces in the South? This was the key question for assessing the Soviet leadership's attitude to Vietnam. This was the very reason Liu Shaoqi took up this point. Nevertheless, though the change in Soviet aid to Vietnam took place in parallel with the escalation of U.S. aggression, especially after the fall of Khrushchev, this information was hidden by Deng Xiaoping even from Liu Shaoqi.

Judging the Vietnamese situation without having this kind of information, the Chinese top leadership developed a one-sided theory that regarded the Soviet Union as a "detached force" of the United States and used this as the pretext for their divisive "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front" theory.

If Liu Shaoqi and other leaders had had a sincere will to investigate the matter, they could easily have had access to this information. The discussion showed that the Chinese top leadership was bent on slandering the Soviet Union without making a serious collective study of the real position of the Vietnamese struggle and the actual situation of Soviet aid to Vietnam.

I could not but realize that what they were most concerned about was not the success and victory of the actual anti-imperialist struggle being waged in Vietnam and other places, but getting hegemony over the people's movements in the world, in competition with the Soviet Union, and that every argument they used was to justify this aim.

"Leninists" Who Do Not Study Lenin

The other episode during the exchanges was on Lenin's theory about united fronts.

In the talks, General Secretary Miyamoto referred to the fact that Lenin proposed united action between the Comintern and the Second International, as a historical fact in the cause of scientific

socialism, which involved an international united front with opportunist currents.

In the next speech, Liu Shaoqi tried to refute this, saying, "I have studied Lenin's articles on the point raised by comrade Miyamoto." But the point Liu Shaoqi took up was on the developments from the split of the Second International at the time of World War I to the foundation of the new International. Miyamoto then gave a more detailed explanation that after the foundation of the Comintern, Lenin dealt with the united front question with the Second International, and made efforts to realize it if the situation required it. But Liu Shaoqi seemed to be unable to understand this at all.

As was shown by the fact that the Chinese party had started a controversy with the Soviet Union with the publication of an article entitled "Long Live Leninism!," they willingly call themselves "Leninists" of the present age. Even in the talks, they often repeated the argument that "we are now in the same situation as Lenin's when the Second International was split." In their articles, they often used Lenin's words to back up their criticism of the Soviet Union. But taking the united front question as an example, to make a full study of Lenin's theory and practice was totally outside their perception. Neither Liu Shaoqi nor any other leader in the talks seemed to be acquainted with Lenin's experience on the question.

This controversy showed how superficial the Chinese dogmatic arguments were.

Throughout the whole four days of discussions, differences of opinion between the two parties were thrown into sharp relief on current central questions: How to face up to U.S. aggression in Vietnam; and whether to strive for the unity of all forces supporting Vietnam or to reject this idea.

Anyhow, one good result was achieved, that is, the leaderships of the two parties had a direct exchange of their views and got a deeper understanding of each other's position. In the final day's session, Liu Shaoqi said, "The talks were useful because we have come to more clearly understand each other's views through the long discussion." We shared this feeling. Liu also said, "Differences of view on some problems must not weaken our unity."

No agreement was reached, but in the calm and unexcited atmosphere, we discussed the differences in each other's position as well as some common points. There was no sign at all of the prospect of the abnormal situation, which started from the talks with Mao Zedong three weeks later, developing into "disruption" of the talks and then to the commencement of CPC interference in Japan.

After the talks, we thought that the mission of our China visit had been fundamentally fulfilled. Peng Zhen asked us eagerly to meet Mao Zedong before we left China. We were not going to refuse, but we thought that the official talks were over, and a meeting with Mao Zedong would be a mere courtesy.

Leaving our luggage in Beijing, we flew to North Korea, the last leg of our tour, on March 11.

9. Return to Beijing—"Warm Welcome" Rally and Joint Communiqué

During our 10-day stay in North Korea, we held talks with Kim Il Sung. We confirmed our unanimity of views on many international issues, including the necessity for international unity in support of Vietnam. On March 22, we published a joint statement between the Japanese Communist Party and the Workers' Party of Korea. On the Vietnam situation, the joint statement especially emphasized the significance of creation of an anti-imperialist international united front. It said:

"Taking advantage of certain difficulties created within the international communist movement, U.S. imperialism is scheming to escalate the aggression against Vietnam, to strangulate the national liberation movement and to invade and destroy the socialist countries one by one. Failure to counteract this with the united might of the anti-imperialist forces hampers the efforts to crush in a more effective way the U.S. imperialists' policies of aggression and war.

"The delegations of the two parties unanimously emphasized that in such a situation it is urgent above all to strengthen international united action and a united front of the anti-imperialist forces in checking the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam and assisting the Vietnamese people."

Sudden Proposal for "Third Stage" of China Visit

When the delegation returned to Beijing on March 21, after completing its program in North Korea, there was an unexpected matter waiting for us: Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Liu Ningyi and some others were at the airport to meet us. They proposed, "Now that you have reached the third stage of your visit to China, we are planning to make a joint communiqué and to arrange a meeting with Mao Zedong and a welcome rally. What do you think of this?"

According to their explanation, the first stage was from our arrival in Shanghai to departure for Vietnam; the talks in Beijing was the second stage and the third was from today. But if they had intended to issue a joint communiqué, it would have been natural to propose this at the two-party talks. It was also exceptional to have a welcome rally just before returning home. It was possible that they had changed their policy during our visit to North Korea. I conjectured that they may have reasoned like this: The JCP delegation visited three countries—Vietnam, China and North Korea; in Vietnam, there was a joint communiqué and in North Korea a joint statement, both declaring the united position of opposition to U.S. aggression in Vietnam. If China alone did not express its intention for unity, it could give the impression externally that it was isolated in Asia. *Renmin Ribao* did not report

the joint communiqué with the Vietnam Workers' Party, but on March 23 it reported the full text of the joint statement with the Workers' Party of Korea, the day following the announcement. I surmised that this could also be taken as a hint of some changes in the Chinese attitude.

They brought forth a policy change by using the argument that there were three stages to our China visit. We were told that Liu Shaoqi had left for Pakistan the same day and Deng Xiaoping had started a visit to earthquake-hit districts, and both were therefore absent. But it was evident that the proposal had been made by them, including these two who had played the leading part in the talks.

Because the JCP and the CPC had confirmed serious differences in their respective positions, the JCP had no plans to propose a joint communiqué. Now that the Chinese party had made this proposal, we decided to accept it on the following condition: "Not to take up the differences of opinion between the two parties, and only to include points of agreement. It should be as brief as possible and to the point."

The mass welcome rally was held on March 26 in the Workers' Gymnasium in Beijing, with the participation of some 16,000 workers and other citizens. Vice-chairmen of the party, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, who were of the same rank as Liu Shaoqi, and many other party leaders attended the rally. They listened intently to a one-hour speech by JCP General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto, who argued for the significance of supporting the Vietnamese people in their struggle, and the urgent need for the formation of an anti-imperialist international united front. On the way back from the rally, Zhou Enlai said to Miyamoto, "You made a speech with excellent content." We were told that because of the absence of Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai would lead the Chinese delegation in the "third stage."

On behalf of the Chinese side, Peng Zhen made a speech which assessed highly the policy and activity of the JCP in every respect.

Next day, *Renmin Ribao* gave front page coverage to a report on the mass welcome rally with a big photo. On page two there was the full text of Miyamoto's speech, and the gist of Peng Zhen's address. The headline read: "Long Live the Militant Friendship between the Communist Party of China and the Japanese Communist Party! Long Live Ever-Victorious Marxism-Leninism! A Grand Welcome Rally for the JCP Delegation in the Metropolis with Comrades Zhou Enlai and Zhu De Attending; Speeches by Comrades Peng Zhen and Kenji Miyamoto."

Differences of Opinion Settled on Whether or Not to Criticize the Soviets by Name

In parallel with the preparations for the welcome rally, the drafting of the joint communiqué proceeded. A drafting committee was set up. Those responsible were: From the Japanese side, vice

delegation head Masayoshi Oka, and from the Chinese, Liu Ningyi. First, the principle was unanimously agreed on the approach for the draft: That it should be "brief and based only on agreed points." The work was immediately allocated to a working level subcommittee. The members of the subcommittee were Itaru Yonehara, Koichiro Ueda and Tetsuzo Fuwa from the JCP delegation, and Wu Lengxi, Zhang Xiangshan and Zhao Anbo from the Chinese.

The most difficult part in the drafting was when the Chinese tenaciously sought to include points in the communiqué, on which there had been disagreement in the talks, but in varied form.

The first draft of the communiqué was prepared by the Japanese side, and handed to the Chinese side. Next day, the Chinese side said, "It is well written. We agree on most points. We have made some rearrangement on certain wordings," and they presented us with the draft after their "rearrangement."But it was far from being "mostly the same as the original draft." It was a thorough revision of the original draft; it included all the Chinese arguments on points on which there had been disagreement in the talks. Refuting this, the Japanese side proposed a second draft. In this way, with occasional heated discussion in the six sessions over five days, the joint communiqué was worked out on the afternoon of March 27, one day before our scheduled departure from Beijing, strictly based on the original agreement that the joint communiqué

should be drafted on agreed points.

The greatest issue in the debate was whether or not to include criticism of the Soviet leadership by name. The Chinese side persistently argued that the Soviet Union should be named, saying, "It should naturally follow as both the CPC and the JCP have been involved in arguments with the Soviets and are critical of their revisionism." But the JCP criticized and countered their hegemonist interference and their collaboration with the United States and other errors, from its own specific viewpoint and judgment. China had also criticized the Soviet leadership, based on its specific viewpoint and individual judgment, in Chinese style. At that time, if the two parties had criticized the Soviet Union by name in a joint communiqué, it would have implied that the two parties had formed a political alliance against the Soviet Union. This would mean actual confirmation of a common approach on their assessment of the Soviet Union and the method of struggle against Soviet errors. Objectively, this would mean the JCP expressing solidarity with the Chinese "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front" position.

It was natural that the Japanese side rejected the Chinese proposal to include "points of disagreement" in the joint communiqué in such a way. In the drafting committee from the beginning, we had argued that no criticism be made by name in relation to the communist movements in the world, and any expression on revisionism should be limited to what had been agreed. In the meeting on the afternoon of

March 27, the Chinese side withdrew their proposal to criticize the Soviets by name, and the draft of the joint communiqué was completed.

10. Shanghai Again (1)—Mao Zedong Demands "Amendment" to the Joint Communiqué

Zhou Enlai Proposes Toast for the Established Joint Communiqué

On the afternoon of March 27, the draft joint communiqué was unanimously agreed on by the drafting committee. Soon after that, formal talks were held between the two parties. The Chinese delegation was led by Zhou Enlai. Zhu De and other leaders, who had attended the mass welcome rally the previous day, were also present. Zhou Enlai welcomed the agreement on the joint communiqué. Both sides unanimously confirmed the joint communiqué, and the heads of the two delegations, Kenji Miyamoto and Zhou Enlai, shook hands in celebration of the joint communiqué.

On the timing of the publication of the joint communiqué, the Chinese side said in the talks that it should be announced after the delegation had met Mao Zedong, as the meeting was referred to in the communiqué. And if this condition were met, the actual date of the announcement would be at Japan's convenience.

In the evening there was a farewell reception for our delegation. With the attendance of many people

from various circles in Beijing, Zhou Enlai himself reported that the two-party joint communiqué was established and he proposed a toast, saying, "The establishment of the joint communiqué between the Communist Party of China and the Japanese Communist Party will deal a heavy blow to U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism."

The JCP delegation wound up its activity in Beijing, and on the morning of March 28 left for Shanghai, where Mao Zedong was reportedly staying. We were accompanied by Kang Sheng, Zhao Anbo and Zhao Yimin, an alternate member of the Central Committee and vice-chief of the Foreign Liaison Department of the CPC, who had not appeared during the period of the talks.

At 9:25 in the morning, we arrived at Shanghai Airport. Kang Sheng and others went to meet Mao Zedong to make "arrangements," and the JCP delegation waited for nearly an hour in the airport waiting room. If they had needed to make practical arrangements, they could have made them in Beijing by telephone before our departure. We had a feeling that it was quite unusual for a courtesy meeting.

After a while, we got a call and left for the house where Mao Zedong was staying. We arrived there a little before 11 o'clock. It was a large house formerly owned by a capitalist. It was so large that it took some time to go by car from the main gate of the grounds to the door of the house.

Mao Zedong asked for a meeting with us soon. As the number taking part from the Chinese side

was small, only five from the JCP delegation went into the meeting room, who were Presidium or Secretariat members of the JCP (Miyamoto, Oka, Kurahara, Yonehara and Sunama), while the rest of us (Ueda, Fuwa, Kudo, Tachiki and Kojima) waited in the next room.

It seemed like more than three hours had gone by. It was an unusually long time for a courtesy meeting. At just past two o'clock, we were taken to a dining room for luncheon, and there we met Miyamoto and others.

Soon Mao Zedong arrived, accompanied by a young woman who appeared to be a nurse.

During the luncheon, there was conversation on various subjects, such as tobacco, romanization of Chinese characters, population and birth control, the perspective for the publication of the next volume of the "Selected Works of Mao Zedong," and the usual talk of Mao that he "would be able to go to see Marx sometime in the near future." Of course, the significant points discussed in the meeting were not included as subjects at lunch.

The only point that seriously got my attention was the following: Referring to the history of relations between the CPC and JCP, especially the 1950 question and the fact that Liu Shaoqi, in 1957, raised objections to the JCP's summing up of the 1950 question, Mao Zedong said they had made a mistake. He meant that they should not interfere in a foreign party. But this was merely a temporizing remark. In reality, he betrayed his own words by

outrageous interference. Anyhow, this is a subject to be dealt with in the later part of this book.

The luncheon finished without any hint to us who had not been in the meeting, as to how the polemics had gone in the meeting room.

The only reference to the meeting was: Toward the end of the luncheon, Mao Zedong said, "What should we do about the meeting? I have nothing more to say." Miyamoto, in reply, said, "We have something more to say, though not much." It was agreed to continue the meeting the next day. After taking commemorative photos of all in the garden, we returned to our hotel just before 4 o'clock in the late afternoon.

In the hotel, we heard about the "meeting" with Mao Zedong from Miyamoto, the delegation leader. We were astonished when told about the contents of the "meeting," because they were very unusual.

Something Quite Abnormal Is Occurring in the CPC Leadership

The meeting proceeded as follows: When General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto and the other JCP delegation members entered the meeting room, Mao Zedong was not there. Instead, there were Zhao Yimin and Zhao Anbo, who had hurried to Mao's house ahead of the JCP delegation. Zhao Yimin abruptly began to speak. He said, "Chairman Mao has a few things to say about the communiqué. Though rather a good one, it does not clarify the

issues; it does not hit nor even touch the point. If things stay like this, one can't see why a communiqué needs to be issued?" Zhao Yimin then verbally put forward six points as Mao's "proposed amendments."

Mao's "proposed amendments" were nothing less than an attempt to put back into the joint communiqué points on which both delegations had settled in the official talks: Criticism of the Soviet Union by name and rejection of united action with them. The aim of the proposal was to impose on the JCP China's "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front" policy. The "proposed amendments" also included a definition of the tasks and the character of the intra-party struggle of each party, to which no reference had been made in the official talks in Beijing.

Mao Zedong's "proposed amendments" were in length equivalent to about 1,000 Japanese characters. It was not the sort of thing that could be described as "proposed amendments." Clearly the naked intention was to totally change the substance of the joint communiqué, from one based on confirmation of points agreed to by the two parties, into a statement supporting the Chinese position, by including allegations from Mao Zedong's policy in place of the key points of the joint communiqué.

The joint communiqué was officially agreed to in the talks between the two parties, with the respective top leaderships taking part, and its establishment was celebrated in a banquet the previous

night which was attended by many people. What does it mean that now a member of the leadership suddenly claims, "I don't recognize it" and proposes to a foreign delegation that it be amended? Such a thing is quite abnormal in bilateral relations between parties, and also in the way of behaving by the Chinese party. Such objections should have been raised in the CPC leadership before the establishment of the communiqué, and the matter settled within the Chinese party—this would be the normal way.

General Secretary Miyamoto talked about his reaction to this. Miyamoto said, "I was surprised to hear it. What could it mean, that Mao Zedong, chairman of the Communist Party of China, proposed such amendments at this stage of a communiqué, which had already been officially confirmed in talks between the two parties in Beijing? Is Mao not in the position of being responsible for the talks between the two parties in Beijing? Is anything wrong with the Communist Party of China? I got the impression from this abrupt and unexpected development that the situation was quite serious and abnormal." (Kenji Miyamoto, "Last Talks with Mao Zedong," an interview with *Shukan Asahi*, June 24, 1977) Something very serious and abnormal is taking place inside the CPC leadership—this was the common impression of those who heard about the actual process of the meeting with Mao Zedong.

11. Shanghai Again(2)—No "Weak" Member in the JCP Delegation

Mao Zedong Is the Source of All Chinese Extremist Arguments

Let me return to describing the meeting. On Mao Zedong's "proposed amendments," which were conveyed by Zhao Yimin, our delegation head, Miyamoto, explained that the proposal was unreasonable. While he was making his explanation, Mao entered the room, and the meeting began immediately.

Mao Zedong began his remarks with the following: "One must not be afraid of isolation. One must not be afraid of war." He said that a plan was now proceeding between the United States and the Soviet Union to encircle, isolate and launch war on China.

> "The United States threatens to escalate the Vietnam War and expand it into China. But we are not afraid of war. We are fully prepared to fight a war.(...)
>
> "In escalating the war and expanding it into China, the United States is likely to make air raids as well as blockade Shanghai, Qingdao, Guangzhou and other coastal areas of China. If the United States mounts an attack on China, the Soviet Union will also invade us. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union has two divisions stationed in Outer Mongolia and has brought in atomic bombs as well. The Soviet Union aims to invade Northeast China from Chita and Khabarovsk and to attack Xinqiang, too. Under their present plans, the United States will expand its aggression from the south and the Soviet Union from the north, thus dividing China into two along the Yangzi River."

This was the same story that Peng Zhen had explained in the meeting in Shanghai one month before, the story of division of China by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Mao went on to say. "The war may cost one hundred million or two hundred million lives, but that would matter little.(...)One should not be afraid of the loss of lives in a war. Many lives were lost during the Korean War; but Korea has been reconstructed fully, being now better than ever.(...)Air raids on Vietnam do not matter much, either. In China we fought against air raids by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and by Japan; but we emerged victorious in the end. It is a good thing that the United States is carrying out air raids; these air raids are uniting the Vietnamese people.(...)International democratic movements do not matter much. Whether they adopt a good resolution or a bad resolution, it is just a scrap of paper, having no power whatsoever."

This was what Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi had said in the talks in Beijing. What Mao said was more exaggerated, but it was now crystal-clear that it was Mao Zedong himself who was the central source of all the Chinese extremist arguments put

forward in the talks.

Joint Communiqué Is "Lacking in Courage, Weak-Kneed and Powerless"

Then Mao abruptly changed the theme from war to the joint communiqué. He asked, "What is your opinion about my proposed amendments?" Miyamoto said, "We will study them later." "This was because the delegation members had not yet had the opportunity for an exchange of opinion, though my [Miyamoto's] own view was clear, leaving no room for doubt." (Kenji Miyamoto, ibid.)

Mao then repeated the criticism of the joint communiqué, which had been conveyed by Zhao Yimin, but this time in his own words. He said, "I was very displeased when I read the communiqué.(...)It has failed to clarify the themes. It mentioned modern revisionism; but one cannot see who is being criticized. Both the Communist Party of China and the Japanese Communist Party criticize Soviet revisionism, so it is meaningless not to mention them by name." Mao was getting increasingly excited and said in a louder voice, "This communiqué has a compromising tone. I must say this: This communiqué is lacking in courage. It is weak-kneed and powerless." Miyamoto said, "The communiqué was first drafted by the Japanese side." Then raising his voice even louder, Mao said, "Those in Beijing agreed to it, too, I presume. They

are weak-kneed." He began to attack the CPC leadership in Beijing. This is what I referred to in section 1 of this book, viz. Mao's criticism of those in Beijing as being "weak-kneed."

On how to deal with the joint communiqué, Mao said, "I do not want to impose my views, but the communiqué, as it now stands should not be made public." His statement, "I do not want to impose my views," only meant that acceptance or not of the "proposed amendments" depended on a decision by the Japanese side. That Mao had said "the communiqué, as it now stands, should not be made public" left no doubt that this would be the final attitude of the Chinese side.

Whatever decision the CPC leadership in Beijing takes in the talks with a foreign party, all such talks become nonsense, once Mao says NO. This was the terrible reality to which the Communist Party of China had come.

General Secretary Miyamoto stated the JCP position over some two hours, including views on a series of questions referred to by Mao Zedong. Then luncheon was prepared, and the day's meeting was discontinued.

"Act as though No Meeting Has Taken Place"

That night, there was a general meeting of the JCP delegation and General Secretary Miyamoto asked us to discuss the matter. I would like here to quote Miyamoto's memoirs on the discussion. He

wrote:

> "That night, the delegation held a formal conference to discuss Mao's proposed amendments. The Mao proposal involved a very serious matter of principle, which could not be dealt with by changing some words and phrases; every member of the delegation made a similar statement. A rupture of the talks would most probably create many difficulties in future relations between the Japanese and Chinese parties, but we had to take a principled stand; otherwise, it would have been a grave theoretical mistake and would have created serious confusion both at home and abroad; there was hardly any need for detailed discussions, because we were unanimous on this. In other words, there were no 'weak-kneed' members in the delegation on the matter." (Kenji Miyamoto, ibid.)

The next morning, when the five members of the JCP delegation who took part in the talks with Mao Zedong arrived at Mao's residence, Zhao Yimin appeared again and asked, "Did you study the communiqué?" General Secretary Miyamoto replied that the communiqué was made at the request of the Chinese side, and that it ought to be written based on agreed points in circumstances in which there were serious disagreements between the two parties, even though there would be points on which each side was dissatisfied. He said that the way Mao Zedong proposed "amendments" lacked reason from the very beginning. Miyamoto gave Zhao Yimin a detailed explanation of the JCP view. Miyamoto said that the established communiqué "shows courage by calling for unity in the present difficult circumstances. We believe that in this respect the communiqué has real significance. If some differences have since developed and made it impossible to agree on a mutually acceptable text, then that cannot be helped; after all, a communiqué should never be imposed by one party on another."

Zhao Yimin immediately left the room to report to Mao Zedong. Some time later Mao Zedong came into the room, but he seemed to have given up the idea of getting the JCP delegation to agree to the line of his "proposed amendments." It was said that Mao, with his expressionless wooden face, hardly showed the attitude of going to speak on his initiative. Miyamoto thought that it would fit in with the aim of the visit to make clear the views of the JCP, and as an addition to his speech made the previous day he elucidated anew the JCP position and views on an anti-imperialist united front against the aggression in Vietnam.

Saying "I have only one or two comments," Mao said that the JCP stand "will be welcomed by the CPSU leadership, but we cannot welcome such a stand." "The communiqué cannot be published. It was a mistake for our side to have proposed issuing a communiqué, which you had not asked for." Miyamoto said, "We do not insist on the communiqué being issued. We firmly believe that our stand will be welcomed neither by the United States nor

by the Soviet Union." This was General Secretary Miyamoto's reply to the Mao's statement.

Thus, the joint communiqué, which was agreed upon as the result of one month of talks between the two parties leaderships was ex post facto "nullified" by the arbitrary statement by Mao Zedong.

It was not only the joint communiqué that was nullified. On his meeting with the JCP delegation, Mao instructed the Chinese participants by saying, "Let it be assumed that there was no meeting with me. No announcement is to be made about the meeting or the remarks made in the meeting; no mention of the visit to Shanghai, either."

The Japanese side made no promise not to publish it. But the JCP restrained from publishing it. Ironically, the fact that General Secretary Miyamoto and Mao Zedong met was published by anti-JCP elements who became the tools of Chinese hegemonist interference, and the Chinese Red Guards who got the information from the Mao clique. We will take up this matter later in this book.

That afternoon, the JCP delegation left Shanghai Airport to return home via Guangzhou. We were accompanied by Zhao Anbo. Kang Sheng and Zhao Yimin remained in Shanghai.

12. Shanghai Again (the Last)—The Day When Attacks on "Beijing" Were Launched

Let me touch on some points which claimed our attention in Mao Zedong's arguments on the situ-

ation and revolution, which he put forward in the first day session of the talks.

As an important basis for the "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front" theory, what Mao Zedong insisted on was that Soviet aid to Vietnam was a sham. He said, "Soviet aid has been given only to the North, with no help given to the South." This was nothing other than the view advanced by Liu Shaoqi in the Beijing talks, which was refuted by General Secretary Miyamoto and on which Deng Xiaoping had to make a hasty excuse. Even Mao Zedong made a stereotyped condemnation of the Soviet Union without correct information.

The fact that Mao Zedong repeated Liu Shaoqi's wrong arguments put forward at the beginning of March, which they had to correct in the talks, showed that Mao Zedong had not seriously studied the record of the two-party talks. That is, his "proposed amendments" were worked out without enough study of the record of the talks themselves. To put it more clearly, they were proposed with the aim of imposing his own policy on the JCP, without regard to the process of the two-party talks.

Mao Zedong, Origin of the "Armed Revolution the Only Way" Theory

Citing the case of the Communist Party of Indonesia, which was destroyed in September the previous year by military suppression after it had plotted armed struggle, Mao Zedong emphasized

the need to prepare for armed struggle, in more blatant terms even than those of Liu Shaoqi: "If once rightist groups attack democratic forces, hundreds of thousands or millions of the members will instantly vanish like mist"; "The Japanese situation is dangerous, too. You must make preparations, otherwise you may be dealt a deadly blow"; and "Parliament is useless."

This Chinese argument was fully refuted and settled to some extent in the talks in Beijing. In order to "prepare for a Third World War," Liu Shaoqi said, "Once a war breaks out, mass movements of hundreds of thousands or millions of people would be useless. But if only several thousand or several tens of thousands of people could take arms in their hands, they would be powerful." Refuting this theory which regards armed struggle as absolute, General Secretary Miyamoto pointed out immediately that the position of stressing preparations for armed struggle as an urgent important task at any time and any place, was wrong. He also pointed out the error of trying to compel Japan to mechanically follow the experience of the Chinese revolution, and recalled that even Mao Zedong had admitted the fundamental differences of conditions between "developed capitalist countries" and countries like China.

Miyamoto referred to the lessons the JCP had learned from its bitter experiences: During the Korean War, some foreign parties interfered in the JCP, and imposed a policy of ultra-left adventurism

on one wing of the party which was in a state of split, and the Japanese revolutionary movement suffered very serious damage.

He said, "We will never repeat the ultra-left adventurist errors such as were committed at the time of the Korean War. Only U.S. imperialism and Japanese reactionary forces would rejoice in seeing the JCP repeat the same error and inflict on itself a crushing blow. If this happened, they would feel able to drive the Japanese people into a war of aggression again and take the road to world war, with full assurance on the home front."

There was no way in which Liu Shaoqi could refute General Secretary Miyamoto's principled answer. In his final remarks, he retracted the point of his previous argument and tried some vindication, saying that he had no intention of imposing the armed struggle policy on Japan; he had admitted that ultra-left adventurist acts at the time of the Korean War were wrong.

However, on this matter Mao Zedong repeated the same argument we had heard from Liu Shaoqi, using even the extreme expression that "parliament is useless."

Miyamoto immediately countered this by saying, "Even if faced with the danger of suppression, we will not repeat adventurist errors, like going into the mountains." Referring to the experience that combined struggle inside and outside the Diet has prevented reactionary bills from being passed by the Diet, he pointed out that such an argument as

"parliament is useless" would not be accepted in Japan.

Mao Zedong did not refute the point and changed the subject. But it clearly showed that Mao Zedong himself had originated the theory of regarding "revolution by force as the only way," which China had propagated throughout the world in its controversy with the Soviet Union.

What Was the Difference between Mao Zedong and "Beijing"?

Most of the CPC leaders in Beijing could not foresee that our visit to Shanghai would end in rupture.

The CPC leaders in the Beijing talks with the JCP delegation, including Peng Zhen and Liu Shaoqi, were subjectively loyal spokesmen on Mao Zedong's theory of an "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front." In the sessions with us, they had explained the argument of U.S.-Soviet complicity and justified the strategic policy of an "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front," using the same words that Mao Zedong used in Shanghai.

But at that time, it was beyond the imagination of the CPC leadership in Beijing to regard the JCP as an enemy that should be overthrown, because it did not agree with their line. Therefore, Zhou Enlai and Peng Zhen, knowing that the JCP had a different opinion from that of China on this issue, thought that it would be useful for China to have a joint communiqué with the JCP, and agreed to the draft joint communiqué, which was compiled on the principle of being "written on agreed points," and they celebrated its establishment. They did not seem to imagine in the least that this could conflict with Mao Zedong's policy. It may be that they thought it was within the limits of Mao's approval, and therefore proposed the joint communiqué with the JCP, and agreed to the draft.

But the hegemonism and splittism of Mao Zedong was far beyond their imagination. According to Mao's view, the parties and forces which objected to his policy, such as the "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front" theory, and hesitated to side with the theory of "armed revolution is the only way"; to put it more generally, the independent parties and forces which refused to give unconditional support to his policy, were enemies who were obstructing his hegemonist plan to dominate the world's communist movements and the anti-imperialist forces.

In particular, Mao's hegemonist strategy was motivated by his desire to assume the leadership of the forces opposing Soviet "modern revisionism," acting as the bastion of modern Marxism-Leninism, so he regarded the JCP as the biggest obstacle to their ambitions—the party which reasonably criticized the errors of the Soviet Union but rejected sympathy with the splitting tactics and hegemonism of the CPC, based on the position of scientific socialism.

Therefore in a "speech" given four months later, Mao Zedong regarded the JCP as one of the "Four Enemies," the other "Three Enemies" being the Soviet Union, the United States and Japanese reactionary forces which were militarily encircling China, and he called for overthrowing the JCP as an important task of the international line of the "Cultural Revolution."

Launching Operation to Overthrow "Beijing" and the JCP-CPC Talks

From Mao Zedong's viewpoint, the attempt to conclude a joint communiqué with the JCP which objected to the "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front" policy, by shelving points of disagreement, was a "weak-kneed" attitude he could not stand for.

It was unlikely that Mao Zedong was not informed by the leadership in Beijing on the development of the talks with the JCP until just before he met the JCP delegation, because Kang Sheng, the main confidant of Mao, had attended all the talks with the JCP, including the meeting with Peng Zhen in Shanghai and the two sessions with Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai in Beijing. It was sure that Mao would have received reports on all the developments in the talks.

This reminds me of a trap set for Peng Zhen: Early in February 1966, he came to meet Mao Zedong for consultations on a "February Outline" on science and cultural problems; as Mao did not express any objections to the outline, he thought that he had got Mao's approval; he then notified the whole party that it was a decision of the party center; but later he was accused of having committed this act, the biggest crime.

This was Mao Zedong's tactic of "leaving him at large for the time being" with the aim of trapping him. Kang Sheng, Mao's closest aide, worked with Peng Zhen and played the key part in trapping him.

Looking back on the development of the JCP-CPC talks, which overlapped with Chinese developments up to the mobilization for the "Great Cultural Revolution," I assume that almost the same method must have been used by Mao Zedong in dealing with the Beijing leadership.

Mao Zedong had received reports on every stage of the process on the joint communiqué, both from official sources and his confidant, Kang Sheng. But he left the matter without expressing any objection. When the situation reached a decisive stage, he took action, and used it in his attacks on the Beijing leadership, who had believed that everything was making steady progress with Mao Zedong's consent.

This concealed process surfaced suddenly in the talks between the JCP delegation and Mao Zedong.

This is my conjecture, but the mobilization for the "Great Cultural Revolution" and the moves to overthrow the CPC leadership, both led by Mao Zedong, were from beginning to end characterized by this kind of conspiracy and trap.

13. Guangzhou(1)—After the Rupture with Mao Zedong

Continuous Attacks Begin on "Anti-Party, Anti-Socialist Elements"

From early on, Mao Zedong had drawn up plans to overthrow none other than the CPC leadership in Beijing around Liu Shaoqi, with the aim of establishing on a firmer basis his absolute autocracy. As mentioned earlier in Section 4, Peng Zhen would be the first target of the operation. Mao's attack on "Beijing," relating to the JCP-CPC talks, was inseparable from this operation.

As referred to in Section 1, Mao's instruction, "Let's mobilize the other selves of the Monkey to storm into the Celestial Palace," was given to Kang Sheng on the same day as Mao told the JCP delegation that the leadership in Beijing was "weak-kneed." This was no coincidence.

In fact, on the plane with the JCP delegation going to Shanghai, Kang Sheng was busy checking some galley proofs of *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily). I heard that, when asked by General Secretary Miyamoto what galley proofs he was checking, Kang replied that it was an article criticizing Wu Han, to be published in *Renmin Ribao*, and that he was taking the galley proofs to be checked by Mao Zedong. Maybe it was the article by Ji Benyu, entitled "The Reactionary Nature of 'Hai Rui Scolds the Emperor' and 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office,'" which appeared in *Renmin Ribao* of April 2. This was the article with which Mao's attack on Beijing escalated to a new stage.

After returning from North Korea to Beijing, I glanced through the *Renmin Ribao* editions published during our absence from China. What drew my attention was the tone, stronger than before, in criticizing "bourgeois ideology," including criticism of Wu Han. The term "anti-socialism" was used many times. But from careful reading, it was evident that the criticism of Wu Han was concentrated on the point of his bourgeois outlook on history, expressed in his eulogizing of Hai Rui, a feudal bureaucrat; it said he was misleading the people and contributing to "anti-socialism." However harsh the words used were, the character of the argument was still confined to the range of academic polemics concerning the evaluation of an historical person.

But when I read the Ji Benyu article in the April 2 issue of *Renmin Ribao* after we moved to Guangzhou, I was quite astonished at the change of tone in the argument. The article insisted that Wu Han was portraying in his historical drama nothing less than an intended criticism of Mao Zedong.

"Taking the form of a person of former days, 'Hai Rui Dismissed' clamorously claimed innocence for a handful of right-wing opportunists who had been dismissed from 'office' by the people. The true theme was to call on the right-wing opportunist

elements, who were dismissed by the people, to rise again."

This was printed in large letters, as a subheading in the article. It alleged that this was the "reactionary nature" of Wu Han's historical drama. Who was the dismissed right-wing opportunist? It was common knowledge among Chinese people that this was none other than Peng Dehuai, who in 1959 criticized Mao's "Great Leap Forward" policy and was purged as an "anti-party element." That is, "Hai Rui" meant Peng Dehuai, and the "Emperor" who was scolded by him and dismissed him, meant Mao Zedong, and that "Hai Rui Scolds the Emperor" and "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office" were both "poisonous weeds" written with the political intention of criticizing Mao Zedong using Hai Rui, and was seeking the comeback of Peng Dehuai and other "anti-party elements."

Another article appeared in the April 5 issue of *Renmin Ribao*, entitled "'Hai Rui Scolds the Emperor' and 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office' Are Two Anti-Party, Anti-Socialist Big Poisonous Weeds." The article specifically referred to the Lushan Meeting where Mao Zedong dismissed Peng Dehuai. Political accusations became more outspoken.

According to the Ji Benyu article, Wu Han was an "anti-party, anti-socialist" element who was attempting to overthrow the Chinese leadership led by Mao Zedong. Wu Han was the then vice-mayor of Beijing under Peng Zhen who was a Political

Bureau member and the mayor of Beijing. If Ji Benyu's was sober criticism, it could not but directly influence the Beijing leadership and the party center.

When I read the Ji Benyu article, my true impression was that "an abnormal situation is taking place in China," in the light of Mao Zedong's attitude in the talks with the JCP delegation in Shanghai.

In fact, this new trend which surfaced at the time developed in a month into the second attack on Beijing: They accused "Notes from Three-Family Village" written in a series in *Qianxian* (Frontline), the magazine of the CPC Beijing City Committee, by Beijing City Committee Secretary Deng Tuo, Wu Han, Beijing City Committee Chief of the United Front Department Liao Mosha and others, as well as "Evening Talks at Yenshan" which Deng Tuo was writing in a series in *Beijing Wanbao* (Beijing Evening News). The articles written by the leadership of the CPC Beijing City Committee were accused of being "anti-party, anti-socialist black lines." This developed into straightforward attacks on Peng Zhen, leading to his dismissal and purge from office at the end of May to the beginning of June.

People to "Welcome" the JCP Delegation Dispersed at a Time

Our delegation arrived at Baiyun Airport in

Guangzhou on March 29, and were met by leaders of the CPC organization in Guangzhou. Many leaders came to where we were staying and eagerly explained the plan for a farewell banquet for the JCP delegation prior to our returning home, and a program during our stay there for theater going and inspections.

But when we returned to the same room, after changing our clothes, there was no one in the room. They might have heard from Zhao Anbo, who was accompanying us, about our talks with Mao Zedong. It was out of the question for them to have contact with anyone whose relations were ruptured with Mao Zedong. They dispersed in all directions like the offspring of a spider.

Before returning home the delegation was scheduled in Guangzhou to summarize its visit to the three countries. The Chinese side was informed of this and they accepted it. So we went from Guangzhou to Conghua hot springs near Guangzhou, and stayed there for about a week. It was obvious that the Chinese were quite embarrassed, wondering how to deal with us, whose relations with Mao Zedong had been ruptured.

It deserves special note that Tao Zhu, the responsible person of the Guangzhou party organization took a firm, moderate attitude toward us. On the day we were to leave for Conghua hot springs, he called at the place where we were staying and had a talk with General Secretary Miyamoto. He also visited Conghua hot springs, and arranged a

farewell banquet. Till the last day his attitude was polite. On April 4, when we left Guangzhou, he saw us off at the station.

Later, Tao Zhu along with Liu Shaoqi became one of the tragic victims of the "Great Cultural Revolution" which had been mobilized by Mao Zedong.

14. Guangzhou(2)—"Cultural Revolution" and Interference

Leaders Who Became Victims of the "Cultural Revolution"

Let me trace the lot of the Chinese party leaders whom we met during our visit. Peng Zhen was the first target of the Mao Zedong attack. He was dismissed in June 1966, and condemned as the leader of the "anti-party, anti-socialist black lines" and "monsters." It must be noted that at the same time, the Chinese mass media, such as *Renmin Ribao* and *Beijing Review*, launched a wholesale campaign, alleging that "Mao Zedong's thought is the beacon of revolution for the world's people," and openly revealed the wild ambition for hegemonic domination by Mao Zedong's thought over the revolutionary and people's movements in the world.

> "Chairman Mao, our great leader, is the sun in the hearts of China's 650 million people and of all the revolutionary people of the world.(...)

> Mao Zedong's thought is an encyclopedia for both the Chinese revolution and the world revolution. It is the acme of Marxism-Leninism in our epoch; it is living Marxism-Leninism at its highest." (*Renmin Ribao* editor's note on publishing the special material, "Mao Zedong's Thought—Beacon of Revolution for the World's People," June 1, 1966)

In January 1967, a photograph of Peng Zhen, with his hands bound behind his back, paraded by the Red Guards through the streets of Beijing, was carried widely by the mass media in Japan.

Liu Shaoqi was hit by Mao's "bombardment" in the Central Committee meeting in August 1966. Later he made self-criticism, but this was not accepted. Next year, he was accused by Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, and others of alleged betrayal to the Nationalist reactionary forces from before the revolution. The publication of the two articles was the turning point in the fate of Liu Shaoqi. One was published in March 1967 by *Hongqi*, written by Ji Benyu and entitled "Patriotism or National Betrayal?" The other was written by the editorial departments of *Hongqi* and *Renmin Ribao* published in May 1967, and entitled "Betrayal of Proletarian Dictatorship Is Essential Element in the Book on 'Self-Cultivation.'" ["Self-Cultivation" refers to the work by Liu Shaoqi titled "On Self-Cultivation of Communists."—Fuwa] From that time, Liu Shaoqi was openly labeled the "No.1 party person in authority taking the capitalist

road." He was arrested, and ended his life in tragic circumstances in 1969. Ji Benyu, who worked as a "theoretical" shock troop to trap and purge Peng Zhen and Liu Shaoqi, was also excluded in 1967 as an "ultra-left" extremist.

Deng Xiaoping also was denounced as a "person in authority taking the capitalist road." But the course he followed during the "Cultural Revolution" was in clear contrast with Liu Shaoqi. Deng Xiaoping, along with Liu Shaoqi, was one of the main targets of Mao's "bombardment" in the Central Committee meeting in August 1966. But Deng repeated his self-criticism to Mao, and unlike Liu, he was restored in 1973 to an important role in the leadership during the "Cultural Revolution." During this period of his first revival, Deng Xiaoping played a leading part in introducing and applying the "Three Worlds" theory, the major content of which was to make an approach to U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital. This played an important part in the unprincipled change of Chinese policy toward Japan, expressed in its change to a positive evaluation of the role of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and Japanese militarism. For Japan's democratic and peace movements, this record will not be forgotten.

Tao Zhu was, in August 1966, "picked out for promotion" to the party center, to become a Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau and vice-premier of the government. He was elevated to the position of No. 4 in the party, next only to

Mao Zedong, Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai. But in January 1967, he was suddenly labeled as "the greatest royalist in China," dismissed, and purged. "Royalist" could mean a protector of a reactionary "person in authority." In September 1967, Yao Wenyuan wrote the article, "Criticism of Tao Zhu's Two Books," published by *Renmin Ribao*. This openly criticized Tao Zhu as a "Khrushchev-type person of ambition," "counterrevolutionary double-dealer slipping in among the party." Tao Zhu became ill when he was under house arrest, but was not allowed actually to see a doctor. Although he was dying, he was moved to a local district, and died of cancer of the pancreas in November 1969, without his family knowing. The circumstances of his death were described in "To My Father, Tao Zhu," a memoir by Tao Siliang, his daughter. Translated into Japanese, her memoir was published in *Sekai Seiji Shiryo* (World Political Materials, published by the JCP Central Committee) at the end of January 1979.

Leaders Who Became Promoters of the "Cultural Revolution" and Interference

In sharp contrast, Zhou Enlai from early on sided with the "Cultural Revolution," although he was one of the Beijing leadership, which was the target of Mao Zedong's attacks. I do not intend to examine here what role he played inside the "Cultural Revolution." But I cannot but refer to the fact that he

played an active part in the forefront of Mao Zedong's hegemonism who accused the JCP of being one of the "Four Enemies," and that he repeated outrageous remarks in his attacks on the JCP.

The slanders of Zhou Enlai in the attacks on the JCP were quite random and irresponsible. One of the examples was his attack on the JCP in relation to the question of Japanese militarism. It was well known that the JCP was most strongly opposed to the revival and strengthening of Japanese militarism, including the reinforcement of the Self-Defense Forces, sending them abroad and the attempt to mal-revise the Constitution. But Zhou Enlai in an interview with James Reston, *New York Times* correspondent, referred to the relationship between Japanese militarism and Japanese political parties and said, "Of the four opposition parties in Japan, only the Japanese Communist Party has differing views with China; that party supports Sato[2] on this question." (The *New York Times*, August 10, 1971) He showered slanders on the JCP again and again in this way.

Of all his comments, the following astonished us the most. In order to conceal his "crime" to have concluded the joint communiqué with the JCP, he did not hesitate to tell the following lie in the face

2 Eisaku Sato, Japanese Prime Minister from November 1964 to July 1972.

of Japanese anti-JCP elements. Zhou Enlai said:

> "When they came in 1966, they wanted to issue a joint communiqué, but Chairman Mao rejected it. We supported Chairman Mao's rejection. But Nosaka and the like used demagogy. As they can't use the names of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen, they use my name. But at that time, I was talking to comrade Le Duan of Vietnam. Therefore, I had nothing to do with it." This was in a meeting with Ichizo Kimura, an anti-JCP element, and others in February 1971.

Of those who attended the JCP-CPC talks, Liao Chengzhi, Zhao Anbo and Zhang Xiangshan belonged to those who immediately sided with the "Cultural Revolution," by unconditionally following Mao Zedong. Their role was to organize hegemonist attacks on the JCP. These organizers of hegemonist interference have been at the center of drafting and implementing China's policy toward Japan, even after the "Cultural Revolution" was declared terminated.

This is a clear evidence that the present Chinese leadership, although criticizing the criminal aspect of the "Cultural Revolution," lacks any self-criticism in relation to its international aspects, especially on hegemonism as expressed in their wholesale interference in the JCP and the Japanese democratic movements, by invoking their "Four Enemies" argument.

INTERFERENCE AND COUNTERATTACK

15. Anti-JCP Disruptive Activities Promoted under the Banner of "Mao Zedong's Thought"

The attack on the JCP by the Chinese hegemonists, led by Mao Zedong, was launched in April 1966, soon after the JCP delegation returned from China.

Overthrow the Party That Rejects "Mao Zedong's Thought"

Taking every opportunity, the Chinese side first concentrated their efforts on propagating their criticism, that the Japanese Communist Party had degenerated into "revisionists." At the same time they tried to foster and encourage anti-party factions that would follow China, in an attempt to overthrow the JCP from within the party. Up to a certain period, they avoided appearing at the front of their attacks on the JCP. Instead, they covertly maneuvered to organize anti-party elements and got them to directly attack the JCP. This was their tactic.

These were probably tactics learned from the foiled interference by Khrushchev and his group. While getting Shiga and company to launch an

anti-party group, Khrushchev and his group unilaterally published a letter of the CPSU Central Committee which criticized the JCP. The result was that from the start they had to face an overall counterattack from the JCP against the hegemonist interference, and that they were compelled to have their ugly interventionist nature exposed to the public at home and abroad. Trying to avoid the same mistake, the Chinese hegemonists put their lackeys, the Japanese anti-party groups in the forefront, while manipulating them from behind in an attempt to overthrow the JCP with its independent line.

In waging an overall counterattack against the Chinese, we published in *Akahata* a chronicle of their interference in its entirety, summarizing their deeds and words since 1966. ("Documents: Facts on Interference and Attacks by Mao Zedong and Company on the JCP and the Japanese Democratic Movements," *Akahata*, August 23, 1967)

It is a vivid record of the blatant behavior of the Chinese side: How they used every occasion of exchanges between Japan and China to criticize the JCP and instigate their Japanese counterparts to rise in disruptive activity.

This chronicle also reveals to a good extent how the Chinese interventionists maneuvered to organize anti-party groups. In carrying out their work, they hurled criticism at the line and activities of the JCP in relation to many issues, such as the international united front and the policy for the revolutionary movement in Japan. In so doing, they tried to

impose "Mao Zedong's thought" on us as their greatest "ideological" weapon. They said:

> —"Mao Zedong's thought" is "the acme of Marxism-Leninism in our epoch" and the CPC is the center of the world revolutionary movement. Genuine "revolutionaries" must unconditionally follow it;
>
> —Any party that neither follows Mao Zedong's thought nor agrees with the CPC has degenerated into a "revisionist" party;
>
> —Genuine "revolutionaries" must stand by the side of the CPC, and with Mao Zedong's thought as their banner; they must rise up to overthrow the "revisionist" party, the JCP.

This appeal which totally denied the independence of the revolutionary and democratic movements in Japan was their central "ideology" and "theory" in instigating their anti-party activity.

"There Is No Independence from China"

Soon after the Chinese side launched such an attack, those who had been expelled from the JCP because of their anti-party activities began attacking the JCP, using the Chinese argument. In journalism also, articles began to appear parroting arguments which would please the Chinese. A typical example was an article by Atsuyoshi Niijima, a researcher of Chinese issues, which appeared in the May 31, 1966 issue of *Ekonomisuto*, a Japanese economic journal:

"There is an argument for independence, for example, from the United States, from China and from the Soviet Union (...). I think we should not be deceived by such words."

"It is because when there is a confrontation of the same dimension, opposition to one side necessarily means commitment to the other.(...) Therefore, there can be no 'independence' between China and the Soviet Union."

"Why does everybody in Japan use the word 'independence' to express his or her true intention? It is nothing but flattery of nationalism."

Even if it did not specify its target, this article was evidently aimed at the independent position of the JCP. According to the writer, whoever criticizes the error of the Soviet Union must side with its "opponent" China, and anyone who does not support the position of China is committed to the Soviet side. The point therefore is, which to take, China or the Soviet Union. In between there can be no "independent position."

Immediately I wrote in *Akahata* a critical article, "Toadyism That Denies Independence," to refute the argument. In this article I pointed out that the article written by Niijima was just a position of sheer flunkeyism that regards the CPC as "the leading center of the international struggle against modern revisionism, the nucleus to be unconditionally committed to and joined by anyone opposed to revisionism"; it regards the CPC view and policy as representing "contemporary Marxism and

Leninism," idolizing and toadying to a specific foreign party, the CPC, and its view. (*Akahata*, June 10, 1966)

Independence from the CPSU is all right but independence from the CPC and Mao Zedong's thought is out of the question—this position of the Niijima article was a manifest expression of a position common to all anti-party elements who were tools of the Chinese interventionists.

The 9th JCP Congress Rejected Uncritical Subservience to Any Foreign Party

The JCP's independent position, which rejects subservience to any foreign party, has been consistent since the JCP 7th Congress that overcame the 1950 question and regained party unity. This position was clearly stated in the JCP 9th Congress in November 1964, two years prior to the rupture with Mao Zedong and company.

Let me give you some examples. As regards a controversy about the world's communist movements, the mass media at that time tended to treat it like a dispute between the CPC and the CPSU. In the situation marked by toadyism, the decision of the 9th Party Congress characterized the party's position as follows:

"On this controversy our party has firmly maintained an independent position, without following uncritically any party or making any attempt to subjugate any party, striving always

to be principled and independent."

The congress decision, while expressing opposition to revisionism, pointed out correctly, in the light of the party's own experiences, the danger of "modern dogmatism uncritically believing and following the line of some brother party in some other country."

The anti-party elements who started disruptive activities in subservience to the Chinese interference had all agreed to this decision of the JCP Congress two years earlier. But the fact was that all they had agreed to was independence from the CPSU, and not the maintaining of genuine independence of the revolutionary movement in Japan. As was blatantly expressed by the Niijima article, their mind was then occupied already by the absolute worship of Mao Zedong's thought and the CPC.

The most typical expression of this was the degradation of Takaji Nishizawa, then JCP Central Committee member.

16. Typical Example of the Personality Cult of Mao Zedong—Takaji Nishizawa's Worship of a Foreign Party and His Degradation

At the 4th CC Plenum on April 28 to 29, 1966 in which a report was given on the JCP delegation's visit to the three countries, Takaji Nishizawa said waveringly, "I am partly for the report and partly against it." Reasons for his vacillation revealed his lack of independence.

What Nishizawa meant by "I am partly against it" was his opposition to the JCP policy on the anti-imperialist international united front. But up to that moment he had never expressed opposition to it. And yet, after hearing a report from General Secretary Miyamoto that Mao Zedong was opposed to the policy, Nishizawa began to think, "What's the matter? It may be a problem in so far as Mao Zedong was opposed to it." According to his speech at this CC meeting, he "had not carefully read" the article of February 4 ("For Consolidation of International United Action and United Front against U.S. Imperialism") which clarified the issue of an international united front, but he realized the problem when he read it carefully after hearing a report on the rupture of the talks with Mao Zedong.

As is clear from this, he did not have any specific opinion of his own on this problem. After much criticism and persuasion by many CC members, he said in his last speech of that day, "I understand it very well. I agree with you."

Nishizawa's Speech Amazed the CC Plenum: "Don't Pull Down the Flag of Mao Zedong's Thought"

From early on, Takaji Nishizawa had had abnormal worship of a foreign party. For some time after World War II, he seemed to be idolizing the Italian Communist Party on the grounds that it was the

biggest party in capitalist countries.

His wife was the daughter of the then JCP General Secretary Kyuichi Tokuda; Nishizawa became his "aide" and played a major role in Tokuda's patriarchal leadership that distorted party building in the postwar period. At the time of the 1950 question, as one of the leading cadres of the Tokuda faction he went to Beijing as an exile, and there he seemed to have switched his old cult to a new one, that of the CPC and Mao Zedong.

He withdrew his opposition at the 4th CC Plenum in April, but at the 6th CC Plenum on August 27 to 30 held for examining the draft documents for the JCP 10th Congress, his position was more blatantly marked by unconditional worship of the CPC and Mao Zedong.

This time he had his prepared paper opposing the party policy and started reading it at the session, without advance notice. The passage was on the whole a mere echo of the argument asserted by the Chinese in the "Great Cultural Revolution." But what astonished me was the tone of his speech. As if he were Mao Zedong or Lin Biao, he high-handedly started criticizing the JCP's independent line, saying that in "a certain part of our party" there existed those who were trying to pull down the flag of "Mao Zedong's thought."

> "No one can guarantee that a Deng Tuo and company do not exist in our party.(...)These comrades raise a banner of Marxism and Leninism, but they began to think that the flag of Mao Zedong's thought should be pulled down. But Mao Zedong's thought is a development of Marxism and Leninism applied to the reality of China, and is genuine Marxism and Leninism in the contemporary world. Abrupt criticism of Mao Zedong's thought or any assertion that its flag be pulled down, without giving any theoretical grounds, is nothing but an expression of the vacillation of such comrades.(...) We must not rely on the unreliable.(...) What we can rely on is the strength of the united people, the strength of all the peoples in Asia and the world armed with Mao Zedong's thought."

Regardless of the propriety of pulling down "the flag of Mao Zedong's thought," the JCP is a party that has never raised the flag of any foreign party, much less the flag of Mao Zedong's thought. Besides, as is clear from the decision of the Party Congress attended by Nishizawa himself, the JCP severely warned against the tendency toward "uncritically believing and following the line of some brother party in some other country." It was in the CC meeting of such a party that Nishizawa suddenly shouted, "Don't pull down the flag of Mao Zedong's thought!" It was such unexpected behavior that the whole Central Committee was dumbfounded.

Of course, there were many criticisms against Nishizawa, and he could not refute any of them. But no matter how his lack of logic was clarified through discussion, he refused this time to withdraw his

opposition and voted against the CC decision.

Over "Takaji Nishizawa's Poetry and Truth"

At that time he declared that he "would not violate the party discipline." But contrary to his pledge, he readily started preparations for divisive activities and in October openly started disrupting the party. An organ magazine then launched by Nishizawa for his anti-party activities was "Study of Mao Zedong's Thought." This name literally symbolized the fact that, in the depth of their minds, not only Nishizawa but also those crazily engaged in disruptive activities, as the tools of the Chinese interference, were thoroughly poisoned by uncritical subservience to "the line of a foreign party."

The party convened the 7th CC Plenum on October 13, 1966, and decided at once to expel Nishizawa from the party.

The Chinese side used every means to maneuver disruptive activities within the JCP, but among the CC members elected at the 9th Party Congress no one but Takaji Nishizawa was trapped and degenerated into a tool of Chinese interference.

This was the evidence of the strength of the unity of the JCP, which does not tolerate any interventionist maneuvers, the principled strength of unity reinforced through a "struggle on two fronts."

After Nishizawa came Kuraji Anzai, who started anti-party activities following Nishizawa, and was expelled from the party in January 1967. Since April

1966, Anzai had repeated wavering statements. He said, "Since I've lost my conviction, I'd like to quit from the leadership and work as a rank-and-file member," and was not a CC member after the 10th Party Congress in October 1966.

Let me introduce an episode. One of our critical articles on Nishizawa at the time was "Takaji Nishizawa's Poetry and Truth." (*Akahata*, December 26, 1966)

As if to supplement his poor theory with "poetry," he often wrote poems in the "Study of Mao Zedong's Thought," criticizing the JCP leading cadres. Some of them were trash and a mere arrangement of slanders, such as "A's face is a traitor's face," or "B's is that of the fifth column"; these hardly deserved our trouble to refute them or even introduce them to readers. But sometimes there were poems that exposed, more eloquently than any of his "articles," his position and the true nature of his subterfuge.

The article "Takaji Nishizawa's Poetry and Truth" clarified the crux of his uncritical subservience to a foreign party and his anti-party activities, through political and 'literary' criticism of his poems. When we finished this article in the Policy Commission, we were at a loss for a title worthy of its content. Just then someone said, "What about 'Takaji Nishizawa's Poetry and Truth'?" "Poetry and Truth" is the title of a Goethe masterpiece. There was not a bit of truth in Nishizawa's "poems," which was the crux of criticism we wanted to

develop in this article. The proposal for the satirical title was readily adopted. Hence the critical article was born with a "literary" title.

The one who suggested the title was none other than the then general secretary, Miyamoto.

17. Red Guards at the Forefront of Intervention and Attacks

JCP Self-Restraint for International Unity

Of course, the JCP carried on its resolute struggle to defeat the disruptive maneuvers of the anti-party elements, and made a thorough and far-reaching theoretical explication and counterattack in relation to many issues on which they attacked the JCP. Through Ichiro Sunama, the then JCP representative stationed in Beijing, the party had from early on made a protest against such interference, demanding that the Chinese at once stop their attempt. But the party avoided bringing this into the open; our counterattacks through *Akahata* were intentionally limited to the minimum essentials. It was for this reason that we did not criticize the Chinese side by name.

Even on "Mao Zedong's thought," the JCP severely pointed out the toadyist error of idolizing as absolute the thought of a foreign party, in an attempt to make it the guideline of the revolutionary movement in Japan, but never referred to the problems of the "thought" itself.

It was not because we had not deeply clarified the matter, nor because we feared a direct confrontation with the Chinese. In consideration of the circumstances, that the Chinese were not in the forefront of anti-JCP attacks, we made much of international unity; we hoped to do our utmost to settle the matter according to the generally recognized international norms governing relations between communist parties. As the main theme of the JCP delegation's visit to the three countries was the task of achieving an anti-imperialist international united front, the international situation urgently demanded our every effort for uniting the forces against imperialism.

Inside China the "Cultural Revolution" was becoming more and more violent, and particularly from around the autumn of 1966, barbarous attack on "capitalist roaders in power" by mobilizing the "Red Guards," began to intensify. "What is the JCP's view of the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'?"—such a question was posed to our party from many quarters. But we did not go beyond our general explanation on the view of a "cultural revolution" based on scientific socialism. We did not make public our analysis of the "Cultural Revolution" itself, then taking place in China. This was because, if we took up the matter, it would inevitably involve a thorough investigation of what was taking place in China, leading to an open and direct criticism of the CPC leadership who were promoting the "Cultural Revolution."

In December 1966 in Japan, there was the "black mist" dissolution of the Diet,[3] and a general election took place in January 1967. In the midst of the election campaign, barbarous actions of Red Guards in Beijing were reported every day through the mass media. This was readily exploited by the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party and others as the most convenient material for their anti-JCP campaign. At the final stage of the election campaign, newspapers headlined, with vivid photos of the scene, the miserable figures of CPC leaders being dragged about by Red Guards through the streets of Beijing, with their hands tied behind their backs and a tricorn on their heads—cadres who were exposed to criticism and accusation by Mao Zedong and his followers as "persons in authority taking the capitalist road."

Persistent voices reached the JCP Central Committee from party members and supporters engaged in the severe election campaign across the country, demanding that the matter be clarified through *Akahata*. But the Red Guards in Beijing were not attacking the JCP. At least at that stage, the "Cultural Revolution" was still seen as an internal problem of China. Therefore, to venture into criticism of the Red Guards who were destroying "capitalist roaders," would be to abandon the norms of self-restraint which the JCP had long maintained, not to escalate the conflict from the JCP side.

Amid the election campaign, every day it was very difficult for us engaged in theoretical activities of the Central Committee, because we could not respond to the persistent demands of the people.

Wall Papers by Red Guards Distort the Factual Process of the JCP-CPC Talks

Ironically, the difficult situation was overcome by the Red Guards themselves, who launched attacks on the JCP. On January 22, 1967, a wall paper was put up in Beijing by the "People's University Red Guards," with the title, "Chronicle of Reactionary Sayings and Doings of Deng Xiaoping"; it included a passage which attacked the JCP as "revisionists":

> "In 1966, a delegation of the Japanese Communist Party visited China. Mainly Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping held talks with the delegation and worked out a statement. Its tone was very low and no mention was made of Soviet revisionism. Chairman Mao sharply criticized it and proposed important amendments, but the revisionist JCP refused to accept them."

As I have already mentioned, it was in July 1966 that Mao Zedong included the JCP among "Four Enemies" of the "Cultural Revolution" and gave directions to fight against it. The wall paper by the

3 "Black mist" dissolution: The then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato dissolved the House of Representatives to avoid having the Diet probe into money scandals.

Red Guards was in line with this directive. But in order to attack the JCP they must find their own "reason." What they regarded as their chief mission at the time was to destroy "the persons in authority taking the capitalist road." Therefore, those who produced the attack by the wall paper took up the so-called inside story of the JCP-CPC talks with the aim of linking the attack on the JCP with their mission, and fabricated as their own "reason," that the JCP was the enemy of the "Cultural Revolution" because it belonged to the same "revisionists" as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. I use the word "produced" because it would have been impossible for the Red Guards to take up the details of the JCP-CPC talks unless the Chinese leadership had provided the information and given them directions.

Contrary to their expectation, this attack led to the serious erosion of the foothold of the interventionists.

First, they brought out the details of the talks between the JCP and Mao Zedong about which Mao himself had said, "Let it be assumed that there was no meeting with me." No matter how they distorted the facts, taking up the details inevitably led to the exposure of the hegemonist intention of the interventionists, that the Chinese started attacking the JCP because it refused to have the Maoist line imposed on it.

Second, in order to make their argument sound plausible that the JCP and Liu Shaoqi belonged in the same category, they had to fabricate the false

story that Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping had worked out the draft joint communiqué, and that Mao Zedong had rejected it at the "drafting" stage.

It was undeniable that the responsible person from the Chinese side for the joint communiqué was Zhou Enlai, and that neither Liu Shaoqi nor Deng Xiaoping was in Beijing at that time. But if the responsible person was Zhou Enlai, who is now on the Tiananmen gate with Mao to inspect the "Red Guards," their "argument" would be seen as totally inconsistent. That is why they nonchalantly fabricated such a false story. The interventionists held fast to this lie, and even Zhou Enlai himself in the end repeated the same lie as that of the "Red Guards." This revealed to the whole world the lack of political morality of the leaders of the "Cultural Revolution."

As soon as we got the whole text of the wall paper from our correspondent Jun'ichi Konno, we wrote an article against the attack, entitled "Refutation of False Charge by 'Red Guards.'" (*Akahata*, January 24, 1967) It was the first document in which the JCP made known the details of the JCP-CPC talks, particularly the details of the unilateral cancellation by Mao Zedong of the joint communiqué on which agreement had already been reached.

In this article we did not yet make a detailed comment on the "Cultural Revolution" itself. But our resolute refutation of the Red Guards had far-reaching repercussions across the country, as it

showed the JCP's dauntless attitude toward the Red Guards and their manipulators.

In the general election conducted on January 29, the JCP achieved an advance both in the number of votes polled and of seats in the Diet. Especially in Tokyo, the capital, we won a seat for the first time in 18 years.

18. Attack on Zenrin Student Building That Marked a Turning Point in the Escalation of Interference

The wall paper of January 22, 1967 by the People's University Red Guards was followed by frequent attacks on the JCP by Red Guards in the streets of Beijing. Vying with each other in slandering the JCP were various groups, including the Red Flag Fighting Unit of Beijing Aviation College, the Red International Fighting Unit for Defense of Mao Zedong's Thought, the Jinggangshan Red Guards of Qinghua University, the Revolutionary Rebellion Headquarters of the Printing Unit in the Capital, the Chinese People's University Red Guards and so on. The more they repeated the same sort of attack, the more clearly was outlined the figure of the "producer," who manipulated them from behind the scenes.

Going further than the attacks by wall papers, they brought in the vandalism of the Red Guards and violently attacked the democratic movements in Japan. This was an attack on the headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association on February 28, popularly known as the attack on the Zenrin Student Building.

Interventionists Appear on the Front Stage

This incident marked a turning point in their attacks. After this, the Chinese interventionists stopped manipulating the anti-party groups from behind and emerged on the front stage and began directly to attack the JCP.

First, Radio Beijing for Japan and the Xinhua News Agency on March 8 gave a totally opposite false account of the incident as "bloodshed" against China staged by the "revisionist elements in the Japanese Communist Party." But the fact was that some Chinese students in Japan and Japanese lackeys of China, using violence, attacked the Japanese democratic movement. Then on March 11, *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), the CPC's central organ paper, carried the same kind of false propaganda under the headline "Revisionists in the Japanese Communist Party Expose Their Counterrevolutionary Features": "Revisionists in the Japanese Communist Party have recently organized hoodlums in Tokyo to make repeated attacks on young Chinese nationals resident in Japan and Japanese champions of Japan-China friendship, causing shocking bloodshed."

A telegram of consolation reportedly sent from the China-Japan Friendship Association to the

"wounded Japanese" contained new demagogy, saying "conspiring with U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and the Japanese reactionaries, the revisionists in the JCP are opposed to China." Also, "comments" by *Renmin Ribao* vehemently propagated the charge that the JCP caused the incident in an attempt to "serve the interests of the Soviet revisionist leading clique and the reactionaries of the United Sates and Japan." This was an additional fabrication in line with the "Four Enemies" theory advocated in July 1966 by Mao Zedong. This was probably the first time that his "Four Enemies" theory was used as a catchphrase in their interference.

We published the following articles and counterattacked them with facts and reason: "Refutation of Radio Beijing Attack on the JCP and the Japan-China Friendship Movement" (*Akahata*, March 15, 1967) and "We Denounce the Interventions and Attacks by *Renmin Ribao* etc. on Our Party." (*Akahata*, March 19, 1967)

Why We Called in Question the "Ultra-Left Opportunist and Great-Power Chauvinist Elements in the CPC"

In these two articles the JCP criticized for the first time the then CPC leadership by name, who, since 1966 had been engaged in interference and attacks against the JCP by manipulating their Japanese lackeys.

We characterized them as "the ultra-left opportunist and great-power chauvinist elements in the CPC" in criticizing the forces that launched unreasonable attacks through Radio Beijing and *Renmin Ribao*. It was very significant that we called them "the ultra-left opportunist and great-power chauvinist elements in the CPC," not "the CPC leadership."

This does not mean that we gave them tit for tat since they labeled us as the "revisionist elements." When we counterattacked Soviet interference by Khrushchev and others, we engaged in polemics with them as "the CPSU leadership," while we candidly pointed out that their position, political and theoretical, belonged to the current of modern revisionism. But with China, the situation was quite different.

The abnormal situation within the CPC which we experienced during our visit to China became apparent through outrages of the "Cultural Revolution"; that their regular party bodies and party rules had already been destroyed. Upon this destruction, a group led by Mao Zedong was trying to get hold of the leadership, in an attempt to build despotic rule over the party and the state. It was this small group centered around Mao that organized interference in the JCP and the democratic movements in Japan, and it was an undeniable fact that we could not simply regard them as the regular "CPC leadership," no matter how they attacked our party in the name of "the CPC," or through "the CPC" organ paper.

We called the then leadership of China "the ultra-left opportunist and great-power chauvinist elements"; this was a very scientific formulation that, based on our correct understanding of the reality, clarified the true nature of their political and theoretical position.

In our March 19 article in reply to *Renmin Ribao*, we again clarified the development of the Chinese interference from April 1966 and the JCP's principled attitude, and severely denounced their hegemonism that brandished "Mao Zedong's thought." We also made clear the errors of their policies on such issues as the international united front, the election and the parliament, and the "Red Guards," on which they concentrated their attack on the JCP. This at the same time served to clarify why we called them "ultra-left opportunist and great-power chauvinist elements," this peculiar leadership group of the CPC that launched interference under such slogans.

19. SPJ Becomes a Cheer Party for Hegemonist Interference

It must be pointed out that another factor that made the attack on the Zenrin Student Building politically significant was that the Socialist Party of Japan (its English name was changed in 1991 to the Social Democratic Party of Japan—ed.) openly became a cheer party for the interference.

SPJ Officials Stand by Interventionists, Joining Hands with Anti-JCP Elements

In 1967, simultaneous local elections took place in March and April, following the general election in January. In Tokyo the JCP and the SPJ signed an agreement on a progressive united front, based on which they succeeded in establishing the first progressive metropolitan government on the strength of metropolitan citizens' support and expectations.

But on the Chinese interference, which had a vital effect on the future of the Japanese democratic movements, the SPJ, the JCP's partner in the joint struggle, was inclined from the beginning to stand by the interventionists.

As I have more than once referred to earlier, the Chinese side used the tactic of turning friendship and interchange movements into tools of interference, labeling as "obstructionist" and excluding from the movements those who were struggling for the independence of the Japanese movements and opposing their interference. At that time, it was SPJ officials who aligned themselves with the Chinese interventionists in all fields, and spoke in defense of their interference, using the pretext of "friendship" and forming a united front with anti-JCP elements who had been expelled from the party.

Take the Japan-China Friendship Association, for instance. Some people in the association insisted that the principle of this movement is to

unconditionally follow China, therefore "obstructionist forces" to this principle must be excluded. In October 1966 the association was "split" when such people deserted it. The key figure in this move was Hisao Kuroda, a senior official of the SPJ.

When the Zenrin Student Building was attacked in late February 1967, Kuroda and several others attended a "fact-reporting meeting," held by the attackers on March 6, shortly after the incident. In the meeting it was proposed that "the incident should be officially called an 'attack by the JCP on the students staying at the Koraku-ryo dormitory.'" This was proposed by none other than Hisao Kuroda. Haruo Okada, SPJ member of the House of Representatives, called on "the peoples of Japan and China to be united in defeating plots and attacks by the JCP," echoing the Chinese claim that it was the JCP that attacked the building.

Sharply distinguishing what individual SPJ officials said and did from what the SPJ did as a political party, when necessary the JCP refuted and criticized each of the officials' speeches and divisive maneuvers against the JCP. But the JCP rejected any attitude to make this an obstacle in the way of JCP-SPJ cooperation in the forthcoming gubernatorial election in Tokyo. There was no doubt that the party's principled attitude played an important part in realizing the progressive metropolitan government by the strength of the progressive united front in Tokyo.

SPJ Officially Adopts "Notification" in Support of Interventionists

However, during the gubernatorial election campaign, the so-called SPJ decision on the incident began to be widely circulated. It was said that the SPJ Central Executive Committee adopted a "decision" saying that "the Zenrin Student Building incident was caused by the JCP and the Democratic Youth League of Japan." Taking a serious view of this information and considering that it might do harm to progressive unity in metropolitan Tokyo, the JCP on March 24 requested the SPJ Central Executive Committee not to make an unreasonable decision about the JCP and the Democratic Youth League of Japan, based merely on a unilateral investigation. Handing them relevant material, the JCP made an official offer, saying, "If you wish it, our party is ready to give a necessary account of the incident at any time."

But the SPJ, without making any contact with the JCP, sent to its local committees the SPJ Central Headquarters' "notification" dated May 18, immediately after the gubernatorial election ended. The "notification" defined the incident as "attacking and injuring the Chinese students" by the JCP; it not only sided with the interventionists and made an unreasonable criticism of the JCP, but also invented the argument that the JCP's "switch to the anti-China line" was the cause of the incident.

They said, "The Japan-China friendship movement has been hampered by a change in the line of the JCP, and the incident has brought to collapse the Japan-China friendship movement by the 'Japan-China Friendship Association.'"

The "notification" was signed by Hisao Kuroda, chairman of the SPJ special committee for the restoration of Japan-China relations, and the "notification" was a faithful reflection of his position as a China follower. It was serious in that it was made public, not as Kuroda's private statement, but as the SPJ's official "notification."

The JCP published refutations of the SPJ's unilateral criticism of the JCP ("On the SPJ's 'Notification' concerning the Attack on the Japan-China Friendship Association Headquarters," *Akahata*, May 24, 1967; "Distortion of the Truth in the Name of 'Fact Finding,'" *Akahata*, June 4, 1967; "Refutation of the 'JCP's Change in Its Line' Argument in the SPJ's 'Notification,'" *Akahata*, June 15, 1967). At the same time it tried to find a reasonable solution: On May 24, JCP Central Committee Chairman Sanzo Nosaka and General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto had a talk with SPJ Chairman Kozo Sasaki and General Secretary Tomomi Narita, and on June 9, Miyamoto met Narita to hand JCP Chairman Nosaka's representation to SPJ Chairman Sasaki. But after this, an SPJ Central Executive Committee meeting adopted a new "document" which was even more supportive of the Chinese interference. The JCP sent them a letter: "We Ask the SPJ Questions," in which it refuted the SPJ argument by showing detailed facts (*Akahata*, July 11, 1967), but the SPJ failed to answer this and kept along the road with the Chinese hegemonists.

The SPJ's line of playing lackey to China means that it lost the independence needed by a progressive Japanese party, resulting in disgraceful behavior. An SPJ delegation visiting China during the "Great Cultural Revolution," marched in the streets of Beijing as sandwich men for "Mao Zedong's thought," displaying signboards with Mao's words as they walked.

This SPJ position eventually helped to undermine the basis of the Japanese progressive movements: They allowed the Chinese "Great Cultural Revolution" leadership to speak ill of the JCP before the SPJ delegation visiting China, and to urge without hesitation that the SPJ accept China's "Four Enemies" theory, at the time when the SPJ was struggling together with the JCP in at least such important cities as Tokyo and Kyoto, as well as in Okinawa.

Three years later, in August 1970, Zhou Enlai reportedly said in front of the visiting delegation led by Kozo Sasaki:

> "For China-Japan friendship, we must fight against the two major enemies, but must also fight against the subversive elements at home. They are Japanese revisionism and Soviet revisionism."

The following is also Zhou's statement made in the same month in the meeting with the visiting SPJ delegation (Kuroda faction):

> "Chairman Mao says, 'All people in the world should stand united to defeat the aggressive U.S. imperialism and all its agents.' I think that Japanese political parties which represent the people, and which regard Japanese monopoly, Soviet revisionism and Japanese revisionism as agents of U.S. imperialism, can unite in the struggle."

These are the meetings which took place some years later, but they show most typically how a Japanese political party degenerates into a disgraceful position at the beck and call of hegemonists, if they uncritically follow a foreign party with no sovereign independence.

20. Struggle against Imposition of Theory, "Political Power Grows out of the Barrel of a Gun"

The attempt to impose the armed struggle policy expressed in the catchphrase "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," formed the central part of the interference in the Japanese revolutionary and democratic movements by the Chinese "Mao Zedong's thought" interventionists.

Attack on the JCP Program That Places Priority on Parliament and Elections

When he met a Japanese delegation in August 1966, Liao Chengzhi admitted that "China has advised the Japanese people to rise in an armed struggle," and added blatantly, "What is wrong with this?"

He went on to say: "Some Japanese people say it is outrageous for China to impose armed struggle on the Japanese people. We advise them to rise in an armed struggle, not because we want them to support us in a China-U.S. war, but because we are confident that armed struggle is the only correct tactic for the Japanese people."

Liao Chengzhi was one of the CPC Central Committee members who attended the JCP-CPC talks. Trying to support his statement he referred to an episode: "Just before I returned from Germany in 1931, I asked an official of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), 'Why wouldn't you rise in an armed struggle?' He replied, 'The Communist Party of Germany is the biggest communist party in the capitalist world, with a membership of some 600,000 and with more than six million votes in an election.' But the fact is that it was annihilated by the Nazis in a week."

This was an extremely childish argument; worse still, he paraded this in a reception in honor of a Japanese delegation visiting to inspect education

conditions in China. This shows how greedy the Chinese leaders were, to urge anybody they met into rising in an armed struggle.

Underlying this was their hegemonist ambition to pass on its armed struggle theory as a universal law for the revolutionary movements in the world, to impose it on every country, the theory that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," advanced by Mao Zedong during the Chinese revolution. Their attempt gathered intensity and barbarity as their interference and attack on the JCP expanded.

When the general election of January 1967 ended, the Xinhua News Agency on February 2 and Radio Beijing on February 4 heaped abuses on the JCP, under the headline, "Japanese House of Representatives Election Ends after a Mean Farce." They targeted the JCP position of attaching importance to elections and parliamentary struggles:

> "What was worth noting in the last general election was that the new and old followers of modern Soviet revisionism glorified to the utmost the bourgeois parliamentary system. These people who are mad for parliamentarianism shouted at the top of their voices all around the country, 'The fate of Japan rests on this election.'(...)Presenting the awful stuff of Khrushchev's revisionism which had gone bankrupt long ago, these bastards shamelessly shouted, 'By obtaining a stable majority in the Diet, we will be able to change the Diet from an instrument that serves the ruling classes into an instrument that serves the people.'"

This was a direct attack on the JCP Program line as an avowed enemy. It goes without saying that the *Choshu Shinbun* group in Yamaguchi Prefecture and other anti-JCP elements, including Takaji Nishizawa and Kuraji Anzai shouted, in tune with that absurd argument, the "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

Instigating Pseudo-Left Violent Groups to Rise in an "Armed Struggle"

In the face of this attack on the JCP Program, we published an article, "Provocations and Slanders by Ultra-Left Opportunists—Defeat demagogy of submissive elements against Party Program." (*Akahata*, April 29, 1967) The article, summing up the historical experiences of the communist movements in the world, thoroughly analyzed the role of parliament and elections in the revolutionary movement.

The article was not a mere refutation of the "comments" by the Xinhua News Agency and arguments by anti-JCP elements following China; it was also an all-out answer to China's "violent revolution only" theory, the followers' golden rule, which typically found expression in the 1964 article by the editorial departments of *Renmin Ribao* and *Hongqi*: "Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev

Revisionism." Because of this the article was of international significance.

In the article, we made clear the error of the ultra-left opportunism of Mao Zedong and his group, and severely warned that their line would in practice lead to collusion with pseudo-left violent groups (so-called Trotskyists) whose task was to destroy and disrupt the democratic movements in Japan, and that the "anti-JCP union" between the submissive elements and the violent groups was already an established fact in the country.

The course followed by the Chinese hegemonists thereafter proved that our warning was correct.

In October 1967, when pseudo-left violent groups caused the Haneda disturbance in an attempt to start "street fighting" in the heart of Tokyo, *Renmin Ribao* praised them to the sky, saying, "These revolutionary youth are the pride of the Japanese people and the future of the Japanese nation rests on them." ("The Japanese Archipelago in Surging Anti-U.S. Waves," *Renmin Ribao*, October 13, 1967). Then in December 1968, Xinhua enumerated, as "revolutionary" actions, the barbarous actions by violent groups in various parts of the country, including the Shinjuku disturbance in October in which they repeatedly set fire to buildings. They praised them to the sky, and even summed up the "Japanese people's struggle," saying that "the political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" theory has taken root in the minds of the Japanese people:

> "By taking militant action in their heroic struggle against the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries, the Japanese people criticized the criminal act by the JCP Miyamoto revisionist group which tried to mislead the Japanese people into a wrong way.(...)The Japanese people have broken the framework of legalism and boldly fought against their enemy with sticks, stones and sickles. Through the struggle the Japanese people have understood more deeply that they should smash the 'parliamentary road' advocated by the Miyamoto revisionist group and that they should never fail to adhere to the Marxist-Leninist way of violent revolution. The truth that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun' is day after day taking root deeper among the Japanese workers, peasants and revolutionary masses." ("Surging Anti-U.S. Patriotic Struggle of the Japanese People," Xinhua, December 22, 1968)

China gave the highest praise to the violent groups with their barbarous acts, including the "United Red Army" whose cruel terrorist acts shocked the public. These violent groups were born of the currents of worshipers of Mao's theory, as their guideline, that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Our criticism that the Mao clique's interference not only meant an attack on the Japanese democratic and revolutionary movements, but concerned the Japanese people as a whole. Our allegation was confirmed by the facts.

I have some more to say. In the face of their blatant interference by instigating armed struggle in

Japan, no political party other than the JCP raised voices of criticism. This brought to light a common weak point: The vulnerability to hegemonism, of Japanese political parties with the exception only of the JCP.

21. Hegemonic Interventionists Meet Dauntless Counterattack on Every Front

Renmin Ribao's Declaration of "All-out War"

The collective terrorism against JCP representative Ichiro Sunama and *Akahata* correspondent Jun'ichi Konno at Beijing Airport on August 3 and 4, 1967, made it clear that the Chinese interventionists had brought their anti-JCP attack to a new stage, indicating that they would stop at nothing to gain their ends. Two days after this barbarous terrorism, *Renmin Ribao* carried an article entitled "Kenji Miyamoto Group's Betrayal."

Saying that the returning to Japan of comrades Sunama and Konno represented another anti-China plot, the *Renmin Ribao* article charged that the responsibility for the collective violence at Beijing Airport must be borne by the JCP. Chanting Mao Zedong's "Four Enemies" phrase, the article heaped abuses on the JCP. It said:

> "It is not at all fortuitous that the revisionist leading group of the JCP cooked up this anti-China incident. For a long time now, it has been acting as wretched trumpeters in the noisy anti-China chorus of the U.S. imperialists, Soviet revisionists and reactionaries of all countries."
>
> "By serving as willing anti-China pawns of U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and the Sato government and grossly betraying the Japanese people's revolutionary cause, the group has joined the ranks of the new scabs of our time."

The article arrived at the conclusion that the disruptive activity by anti-JCP elements should be encouraged and the forces praised as "representing the great hope of the Japanese nation," and that a still larger-scale interference in Japan should be carried on in open cooperation with them.

> "At present, the true revolutionary forces which uphold Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong's thought in Japan, have begun to rebel in a big way against the Miyamoto group. Their strength is rapidly growing. It is these forces which represent the great hope of the Japanese nation."

"There is a reason for rebellion" was a phrase which the Chinese Red Guards used as a slogan for their subversive activity during the "Great Cultural Revolution." Quoting this phrase, the *Renmin Ribao* article praised to the sky the anti-JCP disruptive or "rebellion" elements, who took the oath of allegiance to China.

With the aim of fulfilling their hegemonist ambition, the Chinese interventionists led by Mao Zedong thus declared an "all-out war" against the

JCP and the Japanese democratic movements.

In declaring its "great struggle," they called the JCP the "Miyamoto group," trying to depict it as a group formed by a particular person; this was a transparent dirty trick by which they tried to cover up the reactionary character of their intervention and attack.

This sort of trick was nothing new. In the past, all anti-party elements, such as the Shojiro Kasuga group which opposed the Party Program, the Shiga group which degenerated into Khrushchev followers, and the *Choshu Shinbun* group and Takaji Nishizawa who all became Mao Zedong followers, commonly used the terms "Miyamoto line" and "Miyamoto group" in the hope of covering up the true motive of their anti-party disruptive activities, trying to show that they opposed, not the party itself, but a particular line of the party.

The Mao Zedong group, or the Chinese hegemonists trampled on their own party's rules based on democratic centralism, completely destroyed its regular organizations, central and local, and replaced them with the regime of personal despotism centering around Mao Zedong. Now they began to mimic the manner of Japanese anti-JCP elements and use the term "Miyamoto group," trying to justify their hegemonist intervention. It was sheer nonsense. *Akahata* commented, "What a laugh!"

The October 10 Article Makes Sweeping Criticism of the Mao Zedong Clique's Domestic and International Lines

The JCP lost no time in making an all-out counterattack. The August 21 issue of *Akahata* carried an editorial entitled "Conclusive Reply to the Disputers—End party-subversion activity of Mao Zedong clique's ultra-left opportunist group and its anti-party traitors," in which the JCP showed an undaunted attitude in the literal sense of the word and by which it set out to analyze the whole problem.

Then on August 23, *Akahata* published, "Facts: Mao Zedong Clique's Interference and Attack on the JCP and Japanese Democratic Movements," giving detailed facts about the whole process of the Mao clique's interference in and attack on the JCP and the Japanese democratic movements. Three pages of *Akahata* were used for this, confirming with many facts the escalation and outrage of the Chinese interference. The material was divided into four periods covering 16 months from April 1966: (1)From April through June, 1966; (2)from July through August, 1966; (3)from September through December, 1966; (4)from January 1967 on.

Many Japanese people learned for the first time the whole picture of the criminal maneuvers for interference by the Chinese hegemonists. Many people respected the JCP because it made persistent

efforts based on reason to settle the matter, not making merely the simple response of, "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."

The JCP published an article, "The Mao Zedong Line and the International Communist Movement" in *Akahata* of October 10, 1967. *Akahata* at that time comprised only eight pages, not 16 pages as at present. If you read that day's issue of *Akahata*, you will find that all pages from the second through the seventh carry this article, with the front page carrying major domestic and international news and the eighth page the TV and radio programs. It was so long that the other news items and articles were obliged to be cut so short as to be carried on one page; nevertheless, it was enthusiastically welcomed by many readers, as an article they were looking forward to, which made a comprehensive and scientific analysis of the nature of the matter, including the Chinese interferences in Japan and the developments in China.

Called the "October 10" article, it received a great public response. I will not go into the detail of the article here.

But let me outline its contents for you: (1)Mao Zedong Faction as Anti-Marxist-Leninist Group; (2)Realities and Nature of "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"; (3)Anti-Marxist-Leninist Character of Mao Zedong Line; (4)Saboteurs of International Communist Movement; (5)To Thwart the Disruptive Activities of the Mao Zedong Faction. From these, you can see that the article's analysis, made from the position of scientific socialism, was quite comprehensive and covered both the domestic and international aspects of the activities of the Chinese hegemonists centered around Mao Zedong. (In those days we still used the term "Marxism-Leninism" to refer to "scientific socialism," and "Marxism-Leninism" in the article should be read as scientific socialism).

22. History Passes Judgment

It is 25 years since the October 10 article was published. Was the JCP criticism correct or not? On this, history has passed a clear judgment. As space does not allow me to deal with all points at issue, I will confine myself to referring only to the "Great Cultural Revolution."

The Essence of the "Great Cultural Revolution" Is the Establishment of Absolute Rule by the Mao Zedong Clique

In the October 10 article we clearly pointed out that the establishment of absolute rule by the Mao clique was the essence of the "Great Cultural Revolution"; we made clear its four aspects based on the specific analysis of the whole process of the "revolution":

> (1) Abusing Chinese people's longstanding trust and love for Mao Zedong as the leader of the Chinese revolution, the Mao clique pushed

to the extreme the personality cult and deification of Mao Zedong;

(2) Declaring that the target of the "Great Cultural Revolution" was those "persons in authority taking the capitalist road," and mobilizing the army and the Red Guards into their campaign, the Mao Zedong clique carried on the "struggle" to overthrow and destroy many central and local organizations and leaders of the party that they regarded as their enemies (the October 10 article criticized that the Mao Zedong clique had failed to present any evidence to show that the so-called "persons in authority" attacked by the Mao clique were counterrevolutionaries);

(3) In the process of the "Great Cultural Revolution" the Mao Zedong clique completely overrode party discipline, promoting on a large scale the disbandment of party organizations to take them over as their own property;

(4) The Mao Zedong clique destroyed not only the party organization but also the state apparatus and the legal order.

In this way, the violent despotic rule of the Mao Zedong clique was established.

> "In this way, what is virtually an illegal situation has been created, which allows no discipline other than faith in the Mao Zedong clique in the name of the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'; this was most explicitly exposed by the collective violence used against comrades Sunama and Konno at the Beijing Airport, showing how rampant was the barbarous violence and terrorism. The kind of organizational terrorism and violence conducted in their own country by the Mao Zedong clique is beyond our imagination, people not ashamed of having mobilized thousands of 'Red Guards' and engaged in every kind of violence, terror and torture even against the representatives of the Central Committee of a foreign communist party who were just returning home under regular procedure." (A passage from the October 10 article)

Prevalent in those days among the Japanese mass media was to take uncritically Mao Zedong's and other leaders' statements at face value and praise the "Great Cultural Revolution" as a great experiment of "self-renewal" of socialism. Political parties, not only the Socialist Party, but also Komeito which apparently disliked communism, sent their delegations to Beijing and praised the "Great Cultural Revolution." This practice lasted for a rather long time.

The October 10 article made a detailed analysis of both Mao Zedong clique's glorification of the "Great Cultural Revolution" and its praise by its Japanese lackeys, and proved that such glorification and praise were too irresponsible and groundless.

Point Reached by the CPC on the "Cultural Revolution" Argument

After Mao Zedong died in 1976, the "Great Cultural Revolution," which had raged all over the country for more than ten years, headed for its end.

Many power struggles were reported during the process, but in 1977 the "Great Cultural Revolution" was declared terminated under the Hua Guofeng leadership, and then in the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in 1981, the Deng Xiaoping leadership, which replaced Hua Guofeng's, adopted a "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China." The resolution is regarded as the final conclusion reached by the CPC on the assessment of the "Great Cultural Revolution."

Let me compare this conclusion with the points of the JCP October 10 article.

The CPC resolution states the following conclusion on the "Great Cultural Revolution":

> "History has shown that the 'cultural revolution,' initiated by a leader laboring under a misapprehension and capitalized on by counter-revolutionary cliques, led to domestic turmoil and brought catastrophe to the party, the state and the whole people."

The resolution also examines the process by which the "catastrophe" and the "domestic turmoil" were brought about.

It forms a conclusion about the cult of Mao Zedong and his deification as follows: "Comrade Mao Zedong's personal leadership characterized by 'left' errors took the place of the collective leadership of the Central Committee, and the cult of

comrade Mao Zedong was frenziedly pushed to an extreme." The cult of Mao Zedong was the greatest driving force in pushing forward the domestic turmoil called the "Great Cultural Revolution."

What was their conclusion about the "persons in authority taking the capitalist road," who were the main target of attack by the "Cultural Revolution"? The CPC resolution says: "The 'capitalist-roaders' overthrown in the 'Cultural Revolution' were leading cadres of party and government organizations at all levels, who formed the core force of the socialist cause. The so-called bourgeois headquarters inside the party (...) simply did not exist."

Eventually, "Almost all leading party and government departments in the different spheres and localities were stripped of their power or reorganized," and the whole power was concentrated in the hands of the group led by those who were close to Mao Zedong, such as Mao's wife Jiang Qing, Lin Biao and Kang Sheng. This was the situation that our October 10 article defined as the "establishment of absolute rule by Mao Zedong."

The CPC resolution did not talk much about the "catastrophe" the Chinese people had to undergo by the "systematic terrorism and violence" during the "Great Cultural Revolution." It simply expresses condolences to the "party and government leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, He Long, Tao Zhu and other comrades in and outside the party," who were persecuted and lost their lives in the "Great Cultural Revolution." But the document of

the court trial against counterrevolutionary groups of the "Gang of Four" including Jiang Qing, and of Lin Biao is another paper which shows the point reached in their assessment of the "Cultural Revolution." It in part charged that in the name of the "Cultural Revolution," the "Cultural Revolution" leadership had killed hundreds of thousands of people, as well as a great number of cadres in different departments of the party and government all over the country.

But these papers draw a groundless demarcation line between Mao Zedong and the other "Cultural Revolution" leadership by saying that Mao Zedong had merely committed an "error," while Jiang Qing and her fellows were "counterrevolutionaries." This shows their limits. But as far as their assessment of the criminal character and content of the situation developed in China by the "Great Cultural Revolution" is concerned, it is clear from the above summary of the resolution that the conclusion by the present CPC leadership fully confirms the correctness of the JCP argument advanced in the October 10 article 14 years ago.

History has passed a clear judgment, leaving no room for doubt.

Yet the CPC has tried not to refer to the crimes the "Great Cultural Revolution" had committed in the international arena. This is the biggest problem of the present Chinese leadership. But now it is time I laid down my pen, for this essay has made a good revisit to today's significance of the October 10

article, "The Mao Zedong Line and the International Communist Movement," which made an all-out criticism of the domestic and foreign policies of the Mao Zedong clique.

A SUPPLEMENT: REVIEW OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF INTERVENTIONS

Akahata from January 12 through April 3, 1992 carried a series of articles, titled "Fighting Chinese Hegemonism." I wrote 14 articles on the whole process of the 1966 JCP-CPC talks, which led to the rupture of the talks with Mao Zedong, and eight articles on the theoretical and political struggle against the Mao Zedong clique and its followers.

Those articles mainly dealt with the 1960s: The JCP-CPC talks which triggered our struggle and the struggle at the early stage. So my supplement will roughly review the later developments of Chinese hegemonism in relation to Japan.

A Change to a Policy of U.S.-China Rapprochement

When the Chinese hegemonists began to attack the JCP, they tried to show themselves as the world's most militant "ultra-revolutionary." The

catchphrases of their attack on the JCP were that the JCP was following U.S. imperialism; that the party neglected the "armed struggle," being engrossed in parliamentary activity and elections. Their "Four Enemies" comprised U.S. imperialism at the top, Soviet revisionism, Japan's Sato government, as well as the JCP. They listed these three as U.S. allies and collaborators.

From early on, we had pointed out that at the basis of Mao Zedong's policy lay a kind of opportunism which evades the fight against U.S. imperialism. This JCP assertion was proved correct by U.S. President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, which greatly surprised the world as a dramatic and radical change of Chinese foreign policy.

From 1970 to 1971, Chen Boda's group and Lin Biao's group were purged from the leadership, which had promoted the "Great Cultural Revolution." (The so-called Lin Biao's coup d'état attempt occurred in September 1971.) Mao Zedong and company took the opportunity of Nixon's China visit in 1972 to publicly throw out the old "anti-U.S., anti-Soviet united front" and replace it with a policy that regarded the Soviet Union as the main enemy, in collaboration with the United States.

In later years, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in their memoirs gave vivid descriptions as to what attitudes the Chinese leadership had taken toward President Nixon and other U.S. imperialist leaders visiting Beijing.

For instance, Kissinger, in his memoirs, writes

that they saw many posters, "Against U.S. Imperialism!" in the streets of Beijing, and when President Nixon referred to this in his talks with Mao Zedong, Mao and Zhou Enlai burst out laughing. Kissinger writes:

> "Mao, seconded by Zhou, laughed uproariously at the proposition that anyone might take seriously a decades-old slogan scrawled on every public poster in China." (Kissinger, "White House Years")

In brief, he says that the Chinese leaders mocked those who took seriously the slogans denouncing U.S. imperialism, because they were the remnants of tens of years before. This was the uncovered true intention of Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders in the midst of U.S. war of aggression on Vietnam and six years after the rupture of the talks between the JCP delegation and Mao Zedong.

With this change in the policy on the United States, the Chinese leadership also made a complete change in its policy on Japan. The Chinese leadership had denounced the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and had been cautious of a possible revival of Japan's militarism. But it went so far as to make a radical change in this policy, and now welcomed both the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and Japan's arms buildup. It was just what the United States and the Liberal-Democratic Party liked. Then it was out of the question to instigate "civil war" in Japan on the argument, "armed struggle is the only

way," which was based on the theory that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." In fact, the key to the Chinese policy on Japan was now how to approach and keep in touch with the LDP government, Japan's business circles and monopoly capital.

The "Three Worlds" theory is the argument they used to justify this radical change in policy. According to that theory, "The United States and the Soviet Union form the first world; developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and others belong to the third world; and the developed countries between the former two worlds belong to the second world." It is said that that theory was built up by Mao Zedong, and it should also be remembered that Deng Xiaoping for the first time officially advanced it in his address to the United Nations General Assembly. Although Deng Xiaoping had been purged in the "Great Cultural Revolution," he successfully came back with his self-criticism approved. He attended the UNGA in April 1974 as the Chinese representative, and advanced the "Three Worlds" theory in his address.

The "Three Worlds" theory argued that China should be allied with the third world and confront the first world. In addition, it said that a new imperialism (the Soviet Union) was more dangerous and aggressive than the old imperialism (the United States) and China was allowed to join hands with the old imperialism to fight this main danger. In short, the most important role of the "Three

Worlds" theory was to justify the policy of alliance with the United States, which had been opened up by the President Nixon's visit to China.

With this policy change by Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders, all the excuses for their intervention and attacks on the JCP objectively became nonsense. They themselves invalidated those excuses. But even with the excuses being invalidated, they never stopped attacking the JCP but continued nurturing anti-party CPC followers, the tool of their intervention.

The anti-party CPC followers were unable to keep up with the radical change of their master, the Chinese leaders, and there were some new alignments. Some sought a new master to follow and decided to serve the Albanian Party of Labor, which had broken away from China in opposition to their rapprochement with the United States. But whatever radical changes Mao Zedong and his followers might make in their policies, the CPC leadership continued attacks on the JCP and intervention in the Japanese movements, with their new and old anti-JCP followers as their soldiers ("Japanese Workers Party" and the "Japanese Labor Party").

In this way Mao Zedong and company demonstrated that underlying their acts was unreserved great-power chauvinism and hegemonism, with which they sought to control other nations, regarding independent communist parties and revolutionary movements as their enemies.

Review of "Cultural Revolution" Totally Lacks International Aspects

When Mao Zedong died in September 1976, China faced a new situation. The "Gang of Four," including Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong's wife, were arrested; and Hua Guofeng, who had been appointed by Mao Zedong as his successor, entered and fell from power. After these political changes, Deng Xiaoping became the supreme leader of the Chinese leadership in 1978. (He had fallen from power the second time in April 1976, but revived in July 1977 after his self-criticism had been accepted.)

In the more than ten years after the start of the "Great Cultural Revolution," China fell into more serious chaos with deepening contradictions, and the summing up of the problem had become inevitable. For some time after the death of Mao Zedong, the Chinese party had maintained the policy of trying to justify the "Great Cultural Revolution," but discussions seem to have started around the beginning of 1980 on how to sum up the "Great Cultural Revolution." The trial of what they called the "counterrevolutionary clique of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing" was conducted in this period. (The court opened in November 1980 and a judgment was handed down in January 1981.)

We paid attention to the fact that in the process of their discussion for the review there was a certain

self-examination of the international aspects of the "Great Cultural Revolution." One example was that an issue of the CPC's theoretical magazine *Hongqi* in 1980 carried an unsigned article which expressed self-criticism of their error of having imposed on other nations the Chinese policy on revolution. This article exclusively held Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and their group to be responsible, but it was at least a confession of self-criticism, by accepting that the CPC had made the error of interventionism in the "Great Cultural Revolution."

> "Relations between our party and other fraternal parties during the years of the so-called 'cultural revolution' were undermined by Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng who banded together to try to usurp the leadership of the Communist Party of China and state power. These conspirators arbitrarily announced that the CPC was the 'center of world revolution.' They took as their criterion for Marxists and revisionists the attitude of other parties toward the 'cultural revolution' and their ultra-left line. They claimed that 'the Jinggangshan road is applicable to all countries' and that encircling the cities from the countryside was a 'universal law' applicable everywhere and denied that other parties must proceed from their specific conditions and find a revolutionary road that suits the circumstances of their countries."
>
> "Problems of revolution in various countries can be decided only by the parties and people of those countries. Giving orders to other parties and other countries and interfering in their

internal affairs are alien to Marxism and incompatible with proletarian internationalism." ("The Party and People of Various Countries Must Decide Their Own Problems in Revolution," *Hongqi*, No 21, 1980; a Japanese translation carried by *Sekai Seiji* <World Politics—Comments and materials>, December 1980).

The final conclusion of the summing up of the discussions was made public as the official review, "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," which was adopted in June 1981 by the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The resolution reviewed the domestic aspect of the "Cultural Revolution" rather in detail and made clear that it was a criminal error. It said, "The 'Cultural Revolution' initiated by a leader laboring under a misapprehension and capitalized on by counterrevolutionary cliques, led to domestic turmoil and brought catastrophe to the party, the state, and the whole people." On the other hand, the resolution gave nothing of a review to the international aspect of the "Cultural Revolution," viz. interventions in other countries based on "Mao Zedong's thought."

The resolution reconfirmed that "Mao Zedong's thought," which had been the main slogan for their interference, was the basic thought which the party should stick to. This by itself proved that the review of the "Great Cultural Revolution" had not been thoroughly done, and meant that they did not reexamine their interventions in the international arena. The resolution included the "Three Worlds" theory among Mao Zedong's achievements, thus stressing the importance of maintaining the foreign policies advanced at the time of the "Great Cultural Revolution."

The resolution was a blatant manifestation of their idea: They may review and reflect on the "Great Cultural Revolution" as an internal problem, but play innocent on its international aspect. Without any reflection on hegemonism, the hegemonism of Mao Zedong and company was preserved and virtually taken over by their successors. And several years later, when the Soviet Union's Gorbachev presented the idea of *perestroika*, or restructuring, to reexamine the old system and policies, he put the question of hegemonism after Stalin out of court. These facts proved how deep rooted was the hegemonism of the Soviet Union and China.

The JCP made a frank criticism of this attitude of the Chinese leadership. In August 1981 the JCP released an article titled "Review of Interventionism Called for—On the 'resolution' of 6th CC Plenum of the CPC" (*Akahata*, August 22, 1981). In that article, the JCP paid proper attention to the then Chinese leadership's efforts for a critical review of the domestic aspect of the "Great Cultural Revolution," but argued with reason that the most serious issue was the failure to examine the international aspects—hegemonist interventions in the revolutionary and democratic movements of other countries:

"The most serious issue, however, is that the review scarcely mentions the international aspects of the 'Great Cultural Revolution,' the foreign policy errors committed from around that period."

"One of the most serious and most far-reaching errors in the foreign policy of the 'Great Cultural Revolution' was intervention in parties and revolutionary movements in other countries, the Japanese Communist Party itself having been a direct target of this attack for as long as 15 years."

"Underlying this intervention was the international version of deification of Mao Zedong: 'It (Mao Zedong's thought) is the acme of Marxism-Leninism in our epoch,(...)a universal truth applicable everywhere. All oppressed peoples and nations naturally find in Mao Zedong's thought the revolutionary truth they are looking for and regard it as the guide in their struggle for liberation' (*Renmin Ribao*, June 1, 1966). Splits were promoted worldwide, dividing the whole international communist movement by using the criterion of worship or otherwise of Mao Zedong's thought. This historic fact must never be overlooked.

"A principled and concrete analysis of this great issue must be an essential part of the review of the 'Great Cultural Revolution,' an inescapable duty of the party which, by its own interventionism, poisoned the parties and revolutionary movements in other countries. The 'Resolution' of the 6th Plenary Session of the CC CPC, in self-criticism, says that the 'Great Cultural Revolution' committed the error of 'confusing right and wrong on a series of important theories and policies.' This interventionism is the most serious error of 'confusing right and wrong' in the international field during the 'Great Cultural Revolution.'

"But the Resolution does not mention the error of intervention in the parties and revolutionary movements of other countries, nor the poisoning it caused. This is the major reason why we cannot evaluate a review in the 'Resolution' as a final settlement of the errors of the 'Great Cultural Revolution.'"

"As the party that was made a target of extremely unreasonable attacks and intervention by the Communist Party of China under the foreign policy of the 'Great Cultural Revolution' for ten and more years, and as the party that has struggled resolutely against these errors, the Japanese Communist Party points out solemnly that a review of the 'Great Cultural Revolution' in its international aspect is a fundamental issue that carries with it responsibility toward the international communist movement and the world peace and democratic movement." ("Review of Interventionism Called for—On the 'resolution' of 6th CC Plenum of the CPC")

The failure of the CPC leaders to engage in self-examination of their foreign policy went further than merely the wording of the document. They showed no intention to sever "fraternal parties" relations with anti-party splinter groups in other countries, which had been nurtured during the "Great Cultural Revolution," including Japanese

lackeys.

The facts are the very reverse. In the CPC 12th Congress in September 1982, their solidarity with anti-party splinter groups in other countries was openly paraded. Among them were the Japanese Labor Party and the Japanese Workers Party. On this, we at once pointed out the seriousness of the matter and issued a warning in an article titled "Meaning of Change and Its Limits—Especially on interventions since the 'Great Cultural Revolution.'" (*Akahata*, September 25, 1982)

"Parallel Party" Formula Grants Citizenship to Anti-Party Groups

After the party congress in 1982, the CPC began to restore the once severed relationships with communist parties in European countries. But the CPC, without reflecting on the past interference, maintained its ties with the anti-party splinter groups of those parties, saying, "Let bygones be bygones." This showed simply that they had made no self-examination on their hegemonism.

One example is the case of the French Communist Party. In October 1982, General Secretary Georges Marchais visited China and restored formal relations between the two parties. It was reported that in the talks at that time, the CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang characterized the restoration of the two parties' ties as an opportunity "for the two parties to join hands again in a forward-looking manner, by forgetting the past" and the French side made no objection to this. Deng Xiaoping, who later met General Secretary Marchais, reportedly said, "We should not stick to the past but should take a forward-looking stand, so I am satisfied with the meeting."

Before long it was made clear what the Chinese side had meant by repeatedly stressing that "we should forget the past," or "we shouldn't stick to the past." The CPC leadership invited representatives of the French Marxist-Leninist Communist Party in December that year, a French group unconditionally following Beijing, and the French Revolutionary Communist Party in July of the next year. The Chinese leadership set them at ease, saying that the CPC would make no change in its "relations with them," even if the CPC restored relations with the French Communist Party. Under the name of restoring relations, the present Chinese leadership had "parallel relations" with both the communist party of a country and its anti-party splinter groups. Granting citizenship to those anti-party groups, a product of their interference, the CPC leadership tried to have a communist party virtually recognize the CPC's relations with its anti-party groups.

After all, by saying, "Let's forget the past," the Chinese side has simply demanded of the partner party that it should forget the "past" history, that the unconditional follower groups were formed as a result of the Chinese interference, and that it should

get along with the CPC, conniving at the CPC's relations with those groups. It was nothing but a selfish claim, that the CPC stubbornly tried to justify the "past" of interference and keep alive its legacy by getting "parallel party" relations authorized.

As regards the JCP, from 1985 the Chinese side unofficially began trying to feel out the party about the restoration of mutual relations. In brief, our answer was: The JCP will not follow the way of the European and Chinese parties, namely, ex post facto acceptance of an accomplished fact. The JCP demanded: (1) To once and for all settle accounts on the past errors of interference; (2) the principle in restoring the two-party relations should be for the CPC to sever ties with anti-JCP elements and groups.

The details were given in an article titled "What Hinders Restoration of Relations between the Japanese Communist Party and the Communist Party of China?"(*Akahata*, April 17, 1985). CC Chairman Miyamoto also shed light on these problems in his introductory speech at the 10th CC Plenum (16th Congress) in May 1985. He made clear the difference between the JCP's historical relations and the European parties' relations with the Chinese party, and set out clearly that as regards their relations with the JCP there should never be a settlement based on the "parallel party" formula. He said:

"Briefly I will mention some differences between JCP-CPC relations and the CPC-European communist parties relations. In the CPC-CPSU disputes, most of the European communist parties criticized the CPC and sided with the CPSU, which determined the subsequent relations between the CPC and the communist parties in Europe. But in our case we have maintained autonomy toward both the CPC and the CPSU in disputes, indicating an important difference between the attitudes of the JCP and the European communist parties. The truth of the matter is not to be found by arguing that the JCP should follow the way of European communist parties in restoring relations with the CPC, saying merely, 'Let bygones be bygones.'"

JCP-CPC Talks—Unilateral Rejection of Continued Talks

After a course of events, an official letter of the CPC CC was sent to the JCP in August 1985. The letter said to the effect: "Taking note of the official articles carried by the JCP's *Akahata* and a series of statements made by JCP CC Chairman Miyamoto, the CPC proposes holding negotiations on the level of the officers in charge of international activity, on the basis of four principles (independence and self-reliance, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs)." The JCP sent a positive answer to that letter and in September the same year JCP-CPC talks were held after an interval of 19 years.

The JCP delegation to the talks was led by Hiroshi Tachiki, head of the International Commission, and the CPC delegation by Qian Liren, chief of the Foreign Liaison Department.

Since the talks were against such a background, the JCP side thought it natural for the CPC to have fully examined the JCP's view and so expected that the CPC was at least prepared for discussion that would meet the case.

But from the start, such expectation was completely betrayed.

In the talks, the CPC expressed self-criticism on one thing only: "The incident encountered by comrades Ichiro Sunama and Jun'ichi Konno amid the Great Cultural Revolution [the massive terrorist attack on them at the Beijing Airport in 1967—Fuwa] took place in China." They apologized only for this on behalf of the party center. As regards their interference in the JCP and the Japanese revolutionary movement, far from reexamining their own behavior, they never admitted even the use of the word "interference."

As regards their relations with anti-party groups and elements, the Chinese side said that they would not be able to sever the relations, because "they have been formed under certain historical conditions." If they did so, they said, it would amount to a mistake similar to that of the "Great Cultural Revolution." They tried thus to quibble their way out and continue the státus quó.

They had committed unprecedented interventions. Nevertheless they would not admit the fact of their interference and there would be no change in relations with their shock troopers for the interference. In this light, their talk about the "four principles," including "non-interference in each other's internal affairs," would in future relations between the two parties, be sheer nonsense.

When the Japanese side advanced a detailed argument, including refutation of the above, the Chinese delegation said nothing but, "I am not authorized to make statements other than what I've said." The CPC offered talks from their side, but the attitude of the delegation made us doubt whether they had seriously thought of settlement of the problems. After all, the JCP delegation proposed continuation of the two-party talks by the "delegations such as would be able to fully discuss the issues presented in the talks," and expressed its hopes that the next round of talks would be held in Tokyo in the last ten days of October, because the JCP's 17th Congress was scheduled in November. The Chinese side promised to convey the proposal to the party center and give us a prompt reply.

But the Chinese attitude after that was even more irresponsible and insincere than in the September talks:

—There was no reply such as had been promised, and the JCP sent a reminder, but in vain. What the JCP received as late as the end of October was a message of excuse via the Chinese embassy: "We already wrote a letter of reply on October 12, but

its delivery was delayed." It was on December 19, nearly one month after the JCP's congress (November 19 through 24), that the JCP received the letter of reply. In it the CPC proposed no schedule for the two-party talks but just referred to the need to have "some consultations" before the next talks. Surprisingly enough, the letter was dated October 12.

—The JCP promptly sent a letter on December 23, saying that the party was ready to accept the proposal for "some consultations"; but there was no reply from the Chinese side.

—Then on February 18, 1986, the JCP sent a letter of the Central Committee to the CPC Central Committee. The JCP in the letter set out its idea on the problem of the two-party relationship and based on this put the following two questions. They were quite concise.

(1) The CPC admitted there had been "abnormal methods" during the "Cultural Revolution." Do these include interventions in the JCP or not?

(2) Will the CPC sever its ties with the anti-JCP groups and elements? If not, how do they explain the relationship between such attitudes and what they might call the "principle of Marxism"?

On April 12, a letter of reply dated April 10 was sent to the JCP. But it repeated the same general idea that the CPC had so far put forward, without answering the key points of the JCP's questions and no reference was made to the two-party talks and consultations.

—The JCP on May 12 sent another letter of reply

to the CPC's letter of April 10, confirming its idea, and proposed consultations by "a small number of representatives" to specifically make sure of the true intention of the CPC. But one month and a half passed in vain. Then on June 28, the JCP repeated the proposal in a letter.

—It was on September 22, about three months later, that the JCP received a CPC letter dated September 10. To our surprise, the CPC said in the letter: "Your party continues to demand that we cut our contacts with various political groups and organizations that have been formed historically, and with some people [Chinese expression for anti-JCP groups and elements unconditionally following China, which are the product of their interference—Fuwa]." In this situation, even if the talks were held, there would be no positive results from the talks, they claimed. This meant rejecting the continuation of the talks.

The CPC themselves had proposed the talks, saying that they "took note" of the JCP position. Nevertheless, in the end they unilaterally rejected the continuation of the talks, after having postponed for more than a year their reply on the continuation of the talks. Worse still, the reason for the rejection was rooted in their blunt interventionism, that they would not sever their relations with anti- JCP groups and elements.

Underlying Their Attitude: Hegemonism and Pragmatism

The JCP on October 24, 1986 sent a letter to the CPC, making necessary refutation of the views and arguments in their letter of September 10. The JCP letter said: "Now that you have expressed a desire not to continue bilateral talks which were held at your suggestion, and now that you declare explicitly that you want to keep relations with the anti-JCP groups and elements, there is naturally no need for us to exercise further restraint on the publication of the contents and process of the negotiations as a premise for discussions to be continued." It also informed them: "We will make known in an appropriate way all that we consider necessary. We will also resolutely continue our own efforts to pursue reason and truth." Until this time we had restrained ourselves from making public the process and relevant problems, even in the face of the Chinese maneuver to delay the process.

The JCP, after notifying the Chinese side of its view, on November 14, 1986, released a document titled "Process of Consultations on Relations between JCP and CPC." In it the JCP for the first time made public the whole process of the talks which had continued for more than a year, and pointed out that the CPC was responsible for the discontinuance of the talks.

With this as the basis of argument, the document made an in-depth criticism of what underlay the Chinese attitude.

In the first place, the JCP pointed out that "pragmatism" lay at the root of the CPC argument, by which they pursued immediate gains, far from being far-sighted.

Many anti-JCP groups and elements spoke of "friendship with China." Using this as an excuse, the CPC clung to the ties with them, saying that "the more friends we have the better the circumstances." But this attitude "can only be called 'pragmatism,' far from being far- sighted in seeking immediate gains, a 'de-facto lack of principle,' far short of the spirit of 'Workers of all countries, unite,' a fundamental principle of scientific socialism."

In conclusion the document stressed that the central point at issue was in the thought and attitude of the present Chinese leadership, which could not liquidate the legacy of hegemonism and interventionism. It said:

> "Judging from the course of events since March 1985, we must frankly say in conclusion that we feel that the present CPC leadership has not made a critical review as communists of the grave error that the CPC leadership committed against the Japanese Communist Party at the time of the 'Cultural Revolution,' and that it has not yet abandoned the great-power chauvinist ideas on which hegemonist interference was based."
>
> "Our firm belief is that if the CPC as a communist party claims to stand for 'Marxism'

and 'historical materialism,' it should be ready at once to admit the error it committed in its great-power chauvinist and hegemonist interference in our party, and rectify the consequences. This should be done openly. For a party to cling to its error not only tarnishes its honor, but is also a hindrance to world progress, contrary to the great cause of the communist movement."

Their pragmatism that we criticized, along with hegemonism, has afterwards appeared in different fields of the behavior and policy of the Chinese leadership. There came into being an argument in China to glorify modern capitalism: Today's capitalism has now reached the stage of "social-capitalism," after overcoming the stage of monopoly capitalism. This argument appeared a little earlier than the growing expectations of capitalism in the former Soviet Union. When the Tiananmen incident occurred in China in June 1989, we saw the tendency to abandon the cause of socialism in an attempt to seek immediate gains. In my report to the Second National Conference in 1991, I explained the process of the discontinuance of the two-party talks due to the unjust CPC attitudes:

> "Forces that do not observe democratic rules in international relations and those that have energetically tried to export the idea of civil war to Japan and yet have taken no critical look at it, cannot be defenders of democracy in their own country. The Tiananmen incident claims our attention as evidence of this."

If a country which calls itself socialist leaves hegemonism and pragmatism rampant in its international relations, it cannot proceed on a sound track of domestic building, either. This has already been vindicated in the grand history of the 20th century, which includes the destiny of the former Soviet Union.

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It was on the order of Mao Zedong that the Chinese hegemonist interference and attacks on the Japanese Communist Party were launched in 1966, as a focal point of the external operation of what they called the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." They did not hesitate to use any means to carry out their purpose. Their unlawful and uncivilized methods were even worse than those used by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in their interference and attacks on the JCP, which were instigated by Khrushchev and the like.

If a country which calls itself socialist leaves hegemonism and pragmatism rampant in its international relations, it cannot proceed on a sound track of domestic building, either. This has already been vindicated in the grand history of the 20th century, which includes the destiny of the former Soviet Union.

Tetsuzo

The author is Presidium chairman of the Japanese Communist Party and a member of the House of Representatives. Born in 1930 and a graduate of the University of Tokyo, he is widely known for his many theoretical works, which include "Stalin and Great-Power Chauvinism" and "Interference and Betrayal--JCP fights back against Soviet hegemonism."

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